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ARTICLES
[DIS-] INFORMING THE PEOPLE'S
DISCRETION: JUDICIAL DEFERENCE
UNDER THE NATIONAL SECURITY
EXEMPTION OF THE FREEDOM OF
INFORMATION ACT
SUSAN NEVELOW MART & TOM GINSBURG *
I know of no safe depository of the ultimate powers of the society but the
people themselves; and if we think them not enlightened enough to exercise
their control with a wholesome discretion, the remedy is not to take it from
them, but to inform their discretion ....
Thomas Jefferson 1
['A]hat I deem the essential principles of our Government, and consequently
those which ought to shape its Administration ... [includes] the diffusion of
information and arraignment of all abuses at the bar of the public reason...
Thomas Jefferson 
2
• Respectively, Associate Professor and Director of the Law Library, University of Colorado
Law School, Boulder, Colorado, and Leo Spitz Professor of International Law, University of
Chicago, and Research Professor, American Bar Foundation. The authors thank Jennifer
Nou and Nicholas Stephanopolous for helpful comments, along with colleagues at Colorado
Law for their insightful review of this paper at Colorado Law's Works-in-Progress series,
particularly Sarah Krakoff, Helen Norton, Amy Schmitz, and Ahmed White, and colleagues
at the Duke University-North Carolina Workshop for Scholarship on Legal Information and
Information Law and Policy, April 4 5, 2013, especially Lolly Gasaway and Guangya Liu.
Special thanks go to Dr. Jeffrey T. Luftig, Lockheed Martin Professor of Management &
Program Director, University of Colorado Engineering Management Program, for his help
in designing the coding for the statistical analysis. The authors thank Emily Heasley and
Rochelle Laxamana for excellent research assistance.
1. Letter from ThomasJefferson to William CharlesJarvis (Sept. 28, 1820), in 10 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMASJFFERSON 160 61 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1899).
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I think it's clear that some of the conversations [Snowden] has generated,
some of the debate, actually needed to happen .... If there's a good side to
this, maybe that's it.
James Clapper3
As noted by President Obama's recent Revew Group on Intellgence and
Communications Technologies, pervasive state surveillance has never been more feasible.
There has been an inexorable rise in the size and reach of the national security
bureaucracy since it was created after World War II, as we have gone through the Cold
War and the War on Terror. No one doubts that our national security bureaucracies
need to gain intelligence and keep some of it secret. But the consensus of decades of
experts, both insiders and outsiders, is that there is rampant overclassfication by
government agencies. From its inception in 1966, the Freedom of Information Act
(FOJA) has presumed disclosure. And from its inception, Congress intended the federal
courts to act as a brake on unfettered agency discretion regarding classification. But courts
have not played a strong role in this regard. This Article examines the interplay of
overclassfication, excessive judicial deference, and illusory agency expertise in the context
of the national security exemption to the FOA.
The national security exemption allows documents to be withheld that are "specificaly
authorized under criteria established by an Executive Order to be kept secret in the interest
of national defense orforeign policy" and that "are in fact propery classified pursuant to
such Executive Order." The history of national security classification and the passage of
the FOJA illuminate the tension between legislative demands for transparency and the
growth of the national security state with its agency culture of secrecy. That tension has
generally been resolved by the courts in favor of secrecy, despite agreement that there is
rampant overclassification and pseudo classification (labeling documents as sensitive but
unclassified). This deference in turn leads agencies routinely to deny FOA requests that
should in fact be granted. Without adequate court oversight, there is no agency incentive to
comply with the FOA 's presumption of disclosure.
We argue that courts have been systematically W'noring their clear legislative mandate.
Although the government is entitled to substantial deference, the role of the judiciary is not
to rubber stamp claims of national security, but to undertake de novo and in camera
review of government claims that the information requested was both required to be kept
secret and properly classified. Congress amended the FOJA in 1974 to make this
requirement explicit, overruling a judicial attempt to defer completely to government claims
2. THOMASJEFFERSON, FIRST INAUGURAL ADDRESS AT WASHINGTON, D.C. (Mar. 4,
1801), reprinted in INAUGURAL ADDRESSES OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R.
Doc. No. 82-540, at 13 (1952).
3. Ken Dilanian, Clapper: Snowden Case Brings Healthy Debate; More Disclosures to Come,
L.A. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2013, http://articles.latimes.com/2013/sep/12/world/la-fg-wn-
clapper-snowden-disclosures-20 130912.
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that national security classifications are proper.
There are many reasons that courts are reluctant to get involved in determining the
validity of exemption claims based on national security. Overestimation of risk may be
one reason, as is fear of the consequences of error. We also discuss a "secrecy heuristic"
whereby people attribute greater accuracy to "secret" documents. Notwithstanding these
rationales, courts have, in other contexts, wrestled successfully with the conflict between
national security and paramount rights, such as those found in the First and Fourth
Amendments. Courts have the institutional expertise to review claims of national security,
if they choose to exercise it.
Our conclusion is that the systematic failures of the federal courts in the FOJA context
are neither inevitable nor justifed. We show that courts do occasionally order the release
of some documents. This Article includes the first empirical investfation into the
decisionmaking of the D.C. district courts and federal circuit courts in cases involving the
national security exemption to determine what, if any, factors favor document release. We
find that party characteristics are the biggest predictor of disclosure. We also show that,
while politics do not seem to matter at most courts, they do at the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals, at which Republican dominated panels have never ordered disclosure.
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INTRODUCTION
In February 2012, Richard W. Roberts, a district court judge in the
District of Columbia, issued a headline-making order in a Freedom of
20141
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Information Act (FOIA)4 case: the court held that the Office of the United
States Trade Representative (USTR) had failed, after multiple
opportunities, to justify withholding a position paper under the first
exemption to the FOIA. 5 This exemption, so-called "Exemption One,"
allows agencies to withhold documents that are "specifically authorized
under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the
interest of national defense or foreign policy" and that "are in fact propery
classified pursuant to such Executive order.",6 Judge Roberts did what few judges
have done: asking whether the document in question was "in fact properly
classified," concluded that it was not, and ordered disclosure.'
The national security exemption of the FOIA embodies what is arguably
the most important issue in American governance today: the need to
balance transparency with security. As the recent report of President
Obama's Review Group on Intelligence and Communications
Technologies discusses, we live in a surveillance state, and the rationale for
that state is national security. 8 Yet our legal tradition is one that values
transparency, as exemplified by the FOIA. The FOIA requires courts to
protect transparency, but judges have been reluctant to grapple directly
with a claim by the government that a document is classified and may be
withheld from a FOIA requester.9
As we demonstrate below, plaintiffs rarely win FOIA cases when the
government invokes the national security and foreign affairs exemption. By
our account, only 5% of such cases will result in an outright win for a
plaintiff, and fewer than one in five cases lead to even partial disclosure.
Disclosure has become even rarer after 9/11: only two of sixty-one cases
4. U.S.C. § 552 (2012). See What Is FO4?, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
http://www.foia.gov/about.html (last updawd Jan. 2011) (describing that the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) was enacted on July 4, 1966, and provides that any person may
obtain access to federal agency records, unless the record is protected from disclosure by a
specific exemption).
5. Ctr. for Int'l Envd. Law v. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (CIEL 111), 845
F. Supp. 2d 252 (D.D.C. 2012).
6. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (emphasis added).
7. See CIEL 111, 845 F. Supp. 2d at 256 58; Transcript of Oral Argument at 1, Ctr. for
Int'l Envd. Law v. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (CIEL I), 718 F.3d 899 (D.C.
Cir. 2013) (No. 12-5136) (showing that the government appealed the order and that oral
arguments were heard on February 21, 2013); id. at 3 4 (showing that Judge Roberts did not
review the document in question in camera). But see CIEL IV, 718 F.3d at 904 (overturning
Judge Roberts's decision).
8. THE PRESIDENT'S REVIEW GRP. ON INTELLIGENCE & COMMC'NS TECHS., LIBERTY
AND SECURITY IN A CHANGING WORLD 96 (2013) [hereinafter LIBERTY AND SECURITY IN A
CHANGING WORLD], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2013-
12-12_rg-final-report.pdf.
9. See analyses infia Parts III. and V.
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have led to full disclosure since 2001.10 Why are courts so reluctant to
order disclosure in Exemption One cases? This Article examines
Exemption One in light of its historical context, the legislative and judicial
ballet over the appropriate level of deference to the Executive, and the role
of overclassification and pseudo-classification.11 The latter refers to the
phenomenon that agencies have generated their own schemes for
categorizing sensitive information, even when not authorized to do so by
statute. In the absence of a review agency, these schemes vary wildly across
agencies. 12 We evaluate the national security community's estimations of
agency expertise and motivation in classifying national security matters,
and argue that a pattern of overclassification and pseudo-classification has
produced agency denial of FOIA requests that should in fact be granted.
Originally passed in 1966, the FOIA was the culmination of a number of
attempts to increase agency openness and prevent secrecy. But since then,
the evolution of the law on agency classification of documents has not been
favorable to requesters. In 1974, Congress passed an amendment to the
FOIA granting judicial authority to conduct de novo and in camera reviews
of government claims that information was authorized under an executive
order to be kept secret and that the information was in fact properly
classified. The amendment was meant to override the Supreme Court
decision in EPA v. Mink, which held that an agency's claim of withholding
documents based on the national defense and foreign policy exemptions of
10. See ina Part VI.
11. See Dubin v. United States, 363 F.2d 938, 942 (Ct. Cl. 1966) (explaining, in its
discussion of radar laws, that overclassification is somewhat self explanatory: it is excessive
classification, but performed pursuant to a classification scheme laid out by statute or
executive order); see also Reducing Over-Classification Act, Pub. L. No. 111-258, 124 Stat.
2648 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 6 and 50 U.S.C.) (requiring the Department of
Homeland Security to develop a strategy to prevent the over-classification of homeland
security information and to promote homeland security information sharing with state, local,
tribal, and private sector entities, but failing to define "over-classification"); RICK BLUM,
OPENTHEGOVERNMENT.ORG, SECRECY REPORT CARD 2005 9 (2005)
http://www.openthegovernment.org/otg/SRC2005.pdf (2005) (explaining that pseudo
classification is the practice of labeling documents with such terms as "sensitive but
unclassified" (SBU) and that unlike classified documents, there are no consistent rules about
what constituts a pseudo-classified document). Some other examples include Sensitive
Security Information (SSI), For Official Use Only (FOUO), and Controlled Unclassified
Information (CUI). See id. at 9 10.
12. A report issued by a presidential task force in 2009 found there were 117 versions of
the CUI designation in use. See PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON CONTROLLED
UNCLASSIFIED INFO., REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 33 34 (2009); see also Exec. Order
No. 13,556, 3 C.F.R. 267, 268 (2010) (stating that "appropriate consideration should be
given to the report of the interagency Task Force on Controlled Unclassified Information
published in August 2009.").
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the FOIA could be sustained solely on the basis of an affidavit from the
government that the materials were properly classified. 13 During
congressional discussions of the amendment, legislators stated that courts
should review agency classification determinations. However, the
legislators decided that because of agency expertise and experience, the
agency could give substantial weight to agency classification
determinations. Since 1974, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, the busiest
court for FOIA cases, has generally declined to take an active role in
oversight of agency assertions of national security classification. 14 But not
always.
This Article revisits the concept of "agency expertise" in national
security matters. We suggest that there is overwhelming evidence that
agencies do in fact overclassify documents, and that the motivation for
classification arises from an agency culture of secrecy. Agencies sometimes
seek to legitimize the superior value of information by designating it as
''secret." They also use classification to prevent the exposure of
embarrassing and politically volatile information that has no national
security value." At the same time, the very concept of national security has
been expanding since 9/11, with public discourse focusing on a state of
war, in which the next attack is imminent. Cognitive psychology suggests
that in such circumstances people overestimate risks, further tilting
decisionmaking towards secrecy and against civil liberties and
transparency. 16
To illuminate how the courts have balanced national security and civil
liberties, this Article includes an empirical investigation into the
decisionmaking of the D.C. Circuit and identifies the circumstances in
which a FOIA requestor is more likely to get some or all disputed
documents that have been withheld pursuant to the national security or
foreign policy exemption. Besides providing some insight for FOIA
litigators, the analysis has important implications for the perennial efforts to
address national security concerns in an open and democratic society.
Legislative efforts in this regard must take into account judicial reticence to
13. See410U.S. 73,81 (1973).
14. Margaret B. Kwoka, The Freedom of Information Act Trial, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 217,
261 62 (2011) (examining the likelihood of a FOIA case going to trial).
15. See, e.g., Scott Shane, Complaint Seeks Punishment for Class[fication of Documents, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 1, 2011, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/02/us/02 secret.html?
_r=0 (discussing how overclassification is rampant).
16. See OREN GROSS, Security vs. Liberty: On Emotions and Cognition, in THE LONG DECADE:
How 9/11 HAS CHANGED THE LAW 45, 48 (2014) noting that people "tend to link their
assessment of the probability of an occurrence of a particular event to their ability to
imagine similar events taking place.").
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police national security matters, and can do so by encouraging a structured,
step-by-step inquiry into agency action.
The remainder of this Article is organized as follows. Part I frames the
issue by discussing a recent headline-making FOIA case involving
Exemption One, and recounts the social and political trends that produced
the FOIA and examines how the statute evolved regarding judicial review
of claims of exemptions based on national security or foreign affairs. Part II
discusses judicial reluctance to review agency decisions and its possible
causes. Part III then reviews the problems of overclassification and the
illusion of agency expertise. Part IV presents an empirical study of the
FOIA decisions of the D.C. district court and the circuit courts of appeal.
Part V discusses the confluence of the national security narrative and the
transparency narrative. The Article concludes by discussing the role that
courts can play in addressing overclassification, simply by relying on
congressionally approved techniques for oversight: de novo and in camera
review, and using experts to provide a reasoned response to agency
assertions.
I. THE FOIA AND POLITICAL TRENDS IN THE EVOLUTION
OF EXEMPTION ONE
A. CIEL v. USTR: The Exception that (Almost) Proved the Rule
The Center for International Environmental Law v. USTR (CIEL) 1 case,
described at the outset of this Article, provides a useful introduction to the
issues involved in classification and FOIA. In that case, the district court
took the unusual step of rejecting an agency's conclusory declaration that
documents involving international trade negotiations might cause harm to
the United States negotiating efforts and asked whether the documents
were properly classified.18 After the USTR tried three times to justify the
classification, the court rejected the classification and ordered USTR to
turn over the documents. Until the final appellate court review, this case
was an unusual victory for FOIA requestors. Even when a court takes the
17. The Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL) is a non-profit public
interest organization concerned with the impact of trade policy on the environment. See
Who We Are, CTR. FOR INT'L ENVTL. LAW, http://www.ciel.org/AboutUs/index.html (last
visited Oct. 28, 2014).
18. Ctr. for Int'l Envd. Law v. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, 505 F. Supp.
2d 150, 159 (D.D.C. 2007) (CIEL 1); see also Exec. Order No. 12,958, § 1.2(a)(4), 3 C.F.R.
333, 335 (1995) (stating that documents are only properly classified if "the original
classification authority determines that the unauthorized disclosure of the information
reasonably could be expected to result in damage to national security and the original
classification authority is able to identify or describe the damage.").
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unusual step of demanding substantial justification for agency classification
decisions, the ultimate result can still be denial: this is precisely what
happened in a case involving a FOIA request for videos of four prisoners in
Guantanamo Bay Naval Base. 9 The procedural complexity of the case is
itself an indication of the difficulties that FOIA requesters face.
The CIEL case began when CIEL filed a FOIA request for documents
relating to sessions of the Negotiating Group on Investment (NGI) for the
Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA).20 During the negotiations,
the USTR gave documents containing the attending foreign governments'
proposed text and commentary for the investment portion of the FTAA to
the negotiators. Although the USTR identified forty-six documents in its
office responsive to CIEL's request, the USTR withheld all forty-six
documents, citing the deliberative process exemption to the FOIA.21
In 2001, CIEL filed suit and moved for production of a Vaughn Index. 22
During the course of the proceedings, the parties agreed that forty-one of
the documents were properly covered by the deliberative process
exemption. Only four of the documents remained in dispute. At that point
in the litigation, for the first time, the USTR claimed that Exemption One
protected the four documents, as they concerned national security or
foreign affairs. 23 In 2007,Judge Roberts ruled that the agency's declaration
19. Int'l Counsel Bureau v. U.S. Dept. of Def. (ICB v. DOD IT), 906 F. Supp. 2d 1, 9
(D.D.C. 2012).
20. CIEL ,505 F. Supp. 2d at53.
21. Id.atl54 (cidngto5U.S.C.§552(b)(5) (2012)).
22. Complaint at 7, CIEL, 505 F. Supp. 2d 150 (D.D.C. 2007) (No. 1:01CV00498). A
Vaughn Index is an itemized list of justifications for FOIA withholdings prepared by
government agencies in the context of FOIA litigation. A court may require an agency to
produce a Vaughn Index on its own motion, or a plaintiff may petition the court to do so.
The decision to order production is left to the discretion of the court. Agencies are not
required to produce Vaughn Indices when the release of information included in the Index
would allow the requester to deduce the general content of the undisclosed material or when
the agency is not required under the FOIA to confirm or deny that it possesses particular
materials. FOIA requesters may not compel agencies to produce Vaughn Indices during the
administrative process, though agencies may voluntarily do so. Vaughn Indices must include
three types of information: (1) identification of each document being withheld; (2) the
relevant statutory exemption for each document; and (3) an explanation detailing how the
disclosure of the document would impair the interests safeguarded by the statutory
exemption. Citizens Comm'n on Human Rights v. FDA, 45 F.3d 1325, 1326 n.1 (9th Cir.
1995). As the Vaughn court explained, the requirements set forth by the court serve two
main purposes: (1) to ensure "part[ies'] right to information" and (2) to allow "the court
system effectively and efficiendy to evaluate the factual nature of disputed information."
Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 826 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Procedurally, the Vaughn Index has
been a substitute for discovery in FOIA litigation; discovery orders are very rare. See
Kwoka, supra note 14, at 235.
23. See CIEL I, 505 F. Supp. 2d at 154. One undisputed document was released to
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was inadequate to establish that Exemption One covered the documents.
Then, at the request of the USTR, the countries negotiating the FTAA
derestricted three of the documents, which were released to CIEL. 4 The
USTR did not ask for the fourth document to be derestrictedJ.
Now only one document remained in dispute. The document explains
the United States's initial proposed negotiating position on the meaning of
"in like circumstances," which "defines the conditions under which
national-treatment and most-favored-nation rules ... apply."2 1 Judge
Roberts again rejected the USTR's declarations, finding that the USTR's
inconsistent positions on the harm that might be caused "should not
provide the basis for withholding a document. Such inconsistency is an
indication of unreliability, and the agency affidavits will be shown no
deference with respect to any justification for withholding that involves
maintaining trust of negotiating partners." 21 Submitting further affidavits,
the USTR brought a third summary judgment motion but failed to
convince Judge Roberts. 8  The USTR was ordered to turn over the
document, having failed to show that classification of the document was
proper under the criteria set out in the relevant executive order.2 1 Judge
Roberts had never seen the document. 30
The USTR appealed Judge Roberts's decision, and oral arguments were
held before the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals on February 21, 2013.31 On
June 7, 2013, the D.C. Circuit reversed Judge Roberts, preventing
disclosure. 32 "Courts," it noted, "are 'in an extremely poor position to
second-guess' the Trade Representative's predictive judgment in these
matters ... but that is just what the district court did in rejecting the
CIEL. Id.
24. Ctr. for Int'l Envd. Law v. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (CIEL 1), 777
F. Supp. 2d 77, 80 (D.D.C. 2011).
25. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 12 13, Ctr. for Int'l Envd. Law v. Office of the
U.S. Trade Representative (CIELIT), 718 F.3d 899 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (No.12-5136).
26. Initial Brief for the Appellants at 40, CIEL IV, 718 F.3d 899 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (No.
12-5136) (internal citations omitted); see also id. at 8 (describing the document in question).
27. CIEL II, 777 F. Supp. 2d at 85.
28. See Ctr. for Int'l Envd. Law v. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (CIEL l1t,
845 F. Supp. 2d 252, 253, 259 (D.D.C. 2012) (explaining thatJudge Roberts found that the
document was a non-binding starting point for negotiation that could be revised or
withdrawn at any time, so disclosure could not damage the United States's foreign relations
by reducing future flexibility, nor could withholding the non-binding document preserve the
United States's negotiating capital).
29. Id. at 256 57.
30. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, CIELIV, 718 F.3d 899 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (No.
12-5136).
31. Id. at 1.
32. CIELIV, 718 F.3d at 904.
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agency's justification for withholding the white paper."33 As in so many
other previous cases, the government was able in the end to keep a
document secret, on the basis of a generalized judicial invocation of
institutional incapacity.
B. The Evolution of the Disclosure Regime
What made Judge Roberts's decision so noteworthy is that it followed the
congressional mandate to hold the government to the standards of proper
classification and disclosure the FOIA was passed to implement. Few
courts have done so,34 despite the original language of the FOIA and the
clarification Congress passed when courts failed to follow that mandate.
35
This section traces the history and motive of Exemption One, and argues
that understanding the political context of the FOIA's passage helps to
illuminate the deep tensions.
One tendency of bureaucracies is to maintain secrecy about any
information not just potentially classifiable information: 36 as Max Weber
wrote in 1920, "Every bureaucracy seeks to increase the superiority of the
professionally informed by keeping their knowledge and intentions secret.
Bureaucratic administration always tends to be an administration of 'secret
sessions': in so far as it can, it hides its knowledge and action from
criticism .... ,3' That tendency was first addressed in the United States by
the introduction of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) in 1946. 38
The APA reflected a political compromise between proponents of
bureaucratic discretion and opponents of the administrative state, who
valued judicial review as a means of ensuring accountability. 39 The
requirement that agencies disclose information was one of the APA's most
important provisions, as the 1966 House Report on the reform of the APA
33. Id. at 903 (quoting Larson v. Dep't of State, 565 F.3d 857, 865 (D.C. Cir. 2009)).
34. See infia Part IV.
35. The 1974 amendments to the FOIA's national security exemption were expressly
directed at the Court's decision in EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 101 (1973) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). See infia note 61.
36. HERBERT N. FOERSTEL, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AND THE RIGHT TO KNOW: THE
ORIGIN AND APPLICATIONS OF THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 10 28 (1999) (looking
at the history of Americans' belief in the right to know).
37. MAX WEBER, ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 233 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds. &
trans., 1946).
38. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551 559, 701 706 (2012). For a
thorough history of attempts to reform administrative law prior to the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA), see generally George B. Shepard, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative
Procedure Act Emergesfom .New Deal Politics, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 1557 (1996).
39. See Martin Shapiro, APA: Past, Present, Future, 72 VA. L REV. 447, 452 54 (1986)
(describing the compromise).
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noted:
[X] ost important it required "agencies to keep the public currently informed
of their organization, procedures, and rules." The intent of
the public information section of the Administrative Procedure Act (sec. 3)
was set forth clearly by theJudiciary Committee, in reporting the measure to
the Senate. The report declares that the public information provisions are
in many ways among the most important, far-reaching, and useful
provisions.40
The original exemptions to § 3 of the APA were so broad that agencies
used them as an excuse for secrecy, and the abuses pushed the call for
reform. 41 The piecemeal attempts at reforming the APA were unsuccessful
in overcoming federal agencies' disinclination to release information.42
During the time that Congress was tinkering with the APA, there was a
separate movement to pass a comprehensive freedom of information law.43
This was part of a global trend to adopt such laws that began in the
1960s 2. The history of legislation attempting to deal with, among other
things, the failure of agencies to produce documents when requested must
be understood in light of the history of legislation creating agencies whose
charge required secrecy.
The period in which the APA and a national freedom of information law
were being debated coincided with the creation of the post-World War II
national security bureaucracy. The institution of permanent agencies
whose job it is to collect and keep secrets does not actually go that far back
in American history. Before World War II, intelligence units existed only
during wars; when the wars were over, so was the need for the intelligence
bureaucracy. 4' But when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, everything
40. H.R. REP. No. 89-1497, at3 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2418, 2420.
41. FOERSTEL, supra note 36, at 10 28; see also S. REP. No. 89-813, at 38 (1965) ("After
it became apparent that section 3 of the Administrative Procedure Act was being used as an
excuse for secrecy, proposals for change began.").
42. FOERSTEL, supra note 36, at 39 40.
43. ALAN B. LEVENSON & HARVEY L. PITT, GOVERNMENT INFORMATION: FREEDOM
OF INFORMATION ACT, SUNSHINE ACT, PrIVACY ACT 69 70 (1978). News media groups
had worked for ten years to get a Freedom of Information Act passed. Id.
44. Jeannine E. Relly, Freedom of Information Laws and Global Dffusion: Testing Rogers's
Model, 89 JOURNALISM & MASS. COMM. Q. 431,433 (2012) (looking at diffusion of countries
adopting freedom of information laws in relation to news media).
45. FRANK J. SMIST, JR., CONGRESS OVERSEES THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY, 1947 1989 2 (1990) ("Prior to World War II, intelligence was an issue
primarily during wartime. There are few examples of intelligence during peacetime.... Up
until World War II, the United States created military intelligence units only during major
conflicts such as the Civil War and World War I. After hostilities ended, most of these units
were downgraded and deemphasized.").
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changed: Pearl Harbor was perceived in part as an intelligence failure
46driven by excessive concern for secrecy.
After the end of the war, the creation of permanent intelligence agencies
was intended to, among other things, allow for the central collection and
study of foreign intelligence. 4' This led to the establishment of the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) for foreign intelligence, while the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) remained responsible for domestic
intelligence. 49 However, the new agency remained highly secretive, despite
the lessons of Pearl Harbor. 50 Sadly, excessive secrecy within intelligence
communities has remained a systemic problem. 1
46. Id. The intelligence failure the failure to share information with other parts of the
intelligence community in the name of bureaucratic secrecy was on the same scale and of
the same kind, interestingly, as the 9/11 intelligence failure.
Prior to this attack, American intelligence had broken the Japanese diplomatic cipher
and had intercepted and deciphered messages that gave clear and definite indications
that the Japanese intended to attack Pearl Harbor. Unfortunately, because of the
fragmented nature of American intelligence, key Japanese messages were not
decrypted in a timely fashion, and the most important intelligence information was
disseminated slowly to key policy makers in Washington and never disseminated to
the military commanders in Hawaii. Consequently, Pearl Harbor is best described as
an "intelligence failure."
See id. The government tried to suppress discussion of the issue by suppressing the
publication of a book detailing the nature of the failure for five years. See Patricia Sullivan,
Roberta M. Wohlstette; Military Intelligence Expert, WASH. POST, Jan. 10. 2007,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/09/AR200701
0901741.html. Failure of intelligence dissemination was a component of the intelligence
failure that led to the 9/11 attacks. See NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE
U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 247, 276, 541 n.107 (2004) [hereinafter 9/11
COMMISSION REPORT].
47. SMIST, supra note 45, at 2 3. That, of course, is not how the story played out: the
American intelligence community resembles a collection of independent fiefdoms. Id. at 4.
48. National Security Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-253, § 102, 61 Stat. 495 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 50 U.S.C.).
49. Athan G. Theoharis, A Brief History of the FBIs Role and Powers, in THE FBI: A
COMPREHENSIVE REFERENCE GUIDE 1, 20 (Athan G. Theoharis et al. eds., 1999). The
Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) was first an administrative creation; it started in 1908
and was given full statutory authority in 1935. Id. at 3 6, 14.
50. SMIST, supra note 45, at 2 (explaining that key documents were never sent to
military commanders in Hawaii).
51. See id. at 3 4; see also 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 46. The 9/11
Commission Report's findings regarding excessive overclassification have been incorporated
in the Reducing Over-Classification Act, Pub. L. No. 111-258, § 2, 124 Stat. 2648 (2010)
(codified in scattered sections of 6 and 50 U.S.C.), which sets out in its findings that "[t]he
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (commonly known as
the '9/11 Commission') concluded that security requirements nurture over-classification ....
The 9/11 Commission and others have observed that the over-classification of information
interferes with accurate, actionable, and timely information sharing, increases the cost of
[66:4
DIS ]IYFORMIYG THE PEOPLE'S DISCRETION
It was within this framework of newly institutionalized secrecy that the
FOIA was passed in 1966, although President Johnson disapproved of the
law.52 As a statutory framework for protection of access to government
information, the FOIA defined the agency records that were subject to
disclosure, set up a rebuttable presumption of mandatory disclosure, and
granted nine exemptions. 5' The national security exemption is Exemption
One. 4 In light of the importance of the national security bureaucracies, it
was no surprise that the exemption for national security was the first
exemption to the FOIA, occupying a symbolically central place in the
legislation. The original national security exemption to the FOIA stated
that: "This section applies, according to the provisions thereof, except to
the extent that there is involved (1) a function of the United States
requiring secrecy in the public interest . . . .,5 This section was quickly
revised to require that to be exempt from disclosure, the classification of
documents had to be done pursuant to an executive order.5
The early amendment codified the judicial authority to conduct a de
novo review: if the records were improperly withheld, "the court shall
determine the matter de novo and the burden is on the agency to sustain its
action.",57 The Supreme Court has held that the nine "exemptions are




information security, and needlessly limits stakeholder and public access to information."
52. Freedom of Information at 40, NAT'L SEC. ARCHIVE (Thomas Blanton ed., July 4,
2006), http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB194/index.htm. "Documents
from the [Presidential Lyndon Baines Johnson] Library show that the normally gregarious
President, who loved handing out pens at bill signings, refused even to hold a formal
ceremony for the FOIA, personally removed strong openness language from the press
statement, and only agreed to approve the bill after the Justice Department suggested the
tactic that has become President [WV.] Bush's favorite a signing statement that undercut the
thrust of the law." Id.
53. The exemptions are listed in 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2012).
54. Id. The text of the Exemption reads in full: "(b) This section does not apply to
matters that are "(1)(A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive
order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact
properly classified pursuant to such Executive order[.]" Id.
55. Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 383, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1) (Supp. III. 1964).
56. Exempted were documents "specifically required by Executive order to be kept
secret in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy .... 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)
(Supp. III 1964). Agencies do not have to claim an exemption; they have the discretion to
release the information where no harm would result from the disclosure. Chrysler Corp. v.
Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 293 (1979) (explaining that the agency's need or preference for
confidentiality is not a mandatory bar to disclosure).
57. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (Supp. III 1964).
58. Dep't of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976) (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted) (addressing law students who sought to compel the Air Force to
disclose summaries of honors and ethics hearings under pseudonyms).
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Despite the mandate that all of the FOIA exemptions be narrowly
construed, courts interpreting Exemption One have not done so. Classified
and pseudo-classified documents began to occupy a special niche in the
FOIA practice. Even though the FOIA "rejected the traditional rule of
deference" to agency expertise in reviewing an agency's FOIA
determination, " courts routinely granted deference to an agency
determination that a document was properly classified and therefore
exempt from the FOIA.6 0 The tendency of courts to defer to agencies on
national security matters reached its crescendo in EPA v. Mink.1 In Mink,
members of Congress sued under the FOIA to get information about an
underground atomic explosion. Mink held that an agency's claim that
documents were not subject to a FOIA request because they qualified for
the national security and foreign policy exemptions to the FOIA could be
sustained solely on the basis of a government affidavit that the documents
were properly classified.6 ' The Court was not allowed to review the
documents and see if a portion of the documents could be released.6 3 The
concurrence by Justice Stewart blamed Congress for imposing such a
stringent form of deference, noting that hotly contested nuclear tests were
just the sort of information that should be disclosed "consistent with
legitimate interests of national defense., 6 4 In Mink, Justices Brennan wrote
an eloquent concurrence in part, dissent in part on what they believed was
the clear legislative intent of Congress:
We have the word of both Houses of Congress that the de novo proceeding
requirement was enacted expressly "in order that the ultimate decision as to
the propriety of the agency's action is made by the court and prevent it from
becoming meaningless judicial sanctioning of agency discretion." . . .And to
underscore its meaning, Congress rejected the traditional rule of deference to
administrative determinations by "[p]lacing the burden of proof upon the
agency" to justify the withholding .... The Court's rejection of the Court of
Appeals' construction is inexplicable in the face of this overwhelming
59. EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 101 (1973) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
60. This kind of deference is not consistent with "a proper understanding of FOIA or
the constitutional 'right to know."' Barry Sullivan, FOA and the First Amendment: Representative
Democra and the People's Elusive "Right to Know," 72 MD. L. REV. 1, 70 (2012) (discussing the
failure to consider the constitutional underpinnings of the FOIA).
61. Mink, 410 U.S. at 84 (majority opinion). Justice Stewart's position requires looking
at the documents and segregating the parts that could and that could not be disclosed; that
was what the court of appeals had ordered. Id. at 78 (majority opinion); see id. at 94 (Stewart
J., concurring).
62. Id. at 84 (majority opinion).
63. Jd. at 93.
64. Id. at 94 (Stewart,.J., concurring).
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evidence of the congressional design. "5
Mink mandated rubber-stamping agency determinations despite what the
dissent felt was clear congressional intent, and Congress reacted by
legislatively overruling Mink in the 1974 amendments to the FOIA. The
broader context for the congressional discussion about balancing national
security and the access to information necessary for a functioning
democracy was a general concern about overclassification in the
burgeoning national security bureaucracy.6  In 1971, the Chair of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, William Fulbright, was already
complaining that "secrecy ... has become a god in this country."6 8 Even
though the FOIA was originally passed in 1966, by 1972, the
overclassification problem required a new executive order. When President
Nixon signed Executive Order 11,652 on classification in 1972, he had this
to say about overclassification:
Unfortunately, the system of classification which has evolved in the United
States has failed to meet the standards of an open and democratic society,
allowing too many papers to be classified for too long a time. The controls
which have been imposed on classification authority have proved
unworkable, and classification has frequently served to conceal bureaucratic
mistakes or to prevent embarrassment to officials and administrations. 69
However, it was the Nixon Administration's actions that created a
tipping point against unfettered executive secrecy. The political upheaval
65. Id. at 1000 1 (Brennan,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
66. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976), amended by Pub. L. No. 93-502,
88 Stat. 1561.
67. VICTOR MARCHETTI & JOHN D. MARKS, THE CIA AND THE CULT OF
INTELLIGENCE 11 12 (1974) (describing the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA's) original
purpose "as a coordinating agency responsible for gathering, evaluating, and preparing
foreign intelligence of use to governmental policy-makers" and its subsequent actions away
from the original purpose).
68. PHILIP H. MELANSON, SECRECY WARS: NATIONAL SECURITY, PRIVACY, AND THE
PUBLIC'S RIGHT TO KNOW 7 (2001).
69. Richard Nixon, Classification and Declassification of National Security
Information and Material, Exec. Order No. 11,652, 37 C.F.R. 375 (1973); Richard M.
Nixon, Statement on Establishing a New System for Classification and Declassjfication of Government
Documents Relating to National Securi y, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Mar. 8, 1972),
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=3762. Although Nixon openly
discussed excessive classification when signing the Executive Order, the Executive Order
itself expanded the range of documents exempted under Exemption One of the FOIA:
"interests of national defense" was changed to "interests of national security and foreign
relations." See Harold C. Relyea, Opening Government to Public Scrutiny: A Decade of Efforts, 35
PUB. ADMIN. REV. 3, 6 (1975) (comparing Executive Order 10,501 to Executive Order
11,652, and discussing the Foreign Operations and Government Information
Subcommittee's eleven-point criticism of President Nixon's Executive Order).
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caused by Vietnam and the Watergate break-in eroded congressional trust
in the Executive Branch and set the stage for the creation of a special
committee for intelligence oversight. 70 Early in 1975, the Senate appointed
Senator Frank Church to investigate and make recommendations about
intelligence improprieties 71 and the House appointed Representative Otis
Pike to head a similar committee.
72
The Church Committee's investigations of intelligence agency
operations resulted in fourteen reports, issued in 1975 and 1976. In the
Church Reports, newspaper accounts of CIA surveillance within the
United States were confirmed, documenting that the CIA had opened and
photographed hundreds of thousands of pieces of first class mail to and
from U.S. citizens, creating a database holding 1.5 million names known as
CHAOS. 74 The National Security Agency (NSA) had a private
arrangement with three American telegraph companies, which gave
millions of private telegraphs to the NSA from 1947 to 1975. The
70. SMIST, supra note 45, at 9 10; Legislative Proposals to Strengthen Congressional Oversight of
the Nation's Intelligence Agencies: Hearings on S. 4019, S. 2738, S. Res. 419, and S. 1547 Before the S.
Comm. on Govt Operations, 93d Cong. 20 21 (1974) (statement of Sen. Charles McC. Mathias,
Jr.).
71. SMIST, supra note 45, at 10.
72. The Pike Committee was not successful; its final report was repudiated by the
members of the House of Representatives onJanuary 29, 1976. SMIST, supra note 45, at 10;
122 CONG. REC. 1641 (1976). The committee report was leaked to the press. SMIST, supra
note 45, at 10 11.
73. SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, FINAL REPORT, S. REP. No. 94-755 (1976) [hereinafter FINAL
REPORT, S. REP. No. 94755] (contains six books); SELECT COMM. TO STUDY
GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, INTERIM
REPORT, S. REP. No. 94-465 (1975) [hereinafter INTERIM REPORT, S. REP. No. 94-465];
SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES, HEARINGS, S. RES. 21, 94th Cong. (1974) (contains seven volumes), available at
ASSASSINATION ARCHIVES & RESEARCH CTR., CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORTS (1976)
[hereinafter THE CHURCH REPORTS], http://www.aarclibrary.org/publib/church/reports/
contents.htm (providing links to all fourteen reports of the Church Committee).
74. SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS, INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS, FINAL REPORT, S. REP. No. 94-755, at 6
(1976).
75. Id. This litany may sound familiar to modem readers: it echoes several programs
that have been revealed over the past decade. One program was the Bush Administration's
terrorist surveillance program or total information awareness program. See generaly GINA
MARIE STEVENS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31730, PRIVACY: TOTAL INFORMATION
AWARENESS PROGRAMS AND RELATED INFORMATION ACCESS, COLLECTION, AND
PROTECTION LAWS (2003). Congress defunded the program, but parts of the program
continued on. CHALMERS JOHNSON, DISMANTLING THE EMPIRE 105 (2010). The latest
revelations about the National Security Agency's (NSA's) current surveillance program were
leaked to the Guardian by NSA defector Edward Snowden and published in June 2013.
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Church Reports also validated reports of covert actions of the United States
government, such as manipulating elections, 6 and attempting
assassinations in Chile, Cuba, and the Congo."
After working for two years to expose the illegalities that had been
obscured by government secrecy, members of the Church Committee came
down firmly on the side of openness: "In almost every case where liberty
was sacrificed to obtain a measure of security, the sacrifice turned out to be
unnecessary and ineffective."7" Senator Hart said that "[a ] s Americans, we
should never do anything we would be ashamed for the world to know
about.""7 The general consensus was that "[ilf there was one lesson all of
us who served on the Church Committee learned, it was that there are no
secrets, everything comes out, and the promises of improved security nearly
always fail to justify the sacrifice of liberty."80  In the midst of these
revelations about secrecy and the cover-up of illegal activities, the 1974
amendments to the FOIA were being introduced, debated, amended,81
Glenn Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of Verizon Customers Daiy, THE
GUARDIAN, June 5, 2013, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-
records-verizon-court-order. Then came further information about a program called
PRISM, which collects data from major Internet providers, including data on Americans.
See generaly Timothy B. Lee, Here's Everything We Know About PRISM to Date, WASH. POST,
June 12, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/06/12/heres-
everything-we-know-about-prism-to-date. "On March 24, 2009, the [NSA]'s inspector
general issued a 51-page draft report on the President's Surveillance Program, the
warrantless authority under which NSA had collected phone records and email since 2001."
See William Saletan, The Taming of the Spook, SLATE, July 1, 2013, 9:34 AM), http://
www.slate.com/ articles/ news-and-politics/ frame-game / 20 13 / 0 7 /nsa history how burea
ucrats leaks and courts_tamed-governmentsurveillance.html. This report, classified as
top secret, was also leaked to the Guardian by Snowden. Id.
76. THE CHURCH REPORTS, supra note 73, at 8 10, 62, 66 (covering interference in
elections in Chile and interference in the elections in post-war Italy).
77. INTERIM REPORT, S. REP. No. 94-465, supra note 73, at 4 5.
78. GARY HART, Libery and Securi, in US NATIONAL SECURITY, INTELLIGENCE AND
DEMOCRACY: FROM THE CHURCH COMMITTEE TO THE WAR ON TERROR 13, 14 15
(Russell A. Miller ed., 2008) (describing the Church Committee reports on CIA intelligence
during the Cold War and its relation to the current War on Terror).
79. Id. at 15.
80. Id. at 17. The recommendations of the Church Committee inspired the legislation
that led to the creation of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA) and the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC). See Christopher P. Banks, Protecting (or
Destroying) Freedom hrough Law: The USA PATRIOT Act's Constitutional Implications, in
AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES IN AN ERA OF TERRORISM 29, 34
(David B. Cohen &John W. Wells eds., 2004).
81. When the Senate debated the national security exemption to the FOIA, it expressly
removed a requirement that courts sustain the government's finding that documents were
properly withheld unless the withholding was without a reasonable basis, thereby leaving the
de novo standard undisturbed. SUBCOMM. ON GOV'T INFO. & INDIv. RIGHTS OF THE H.
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passed, vetoed, and passed again over the President's veto. These
amendments clearly shifted the legislative mandate in favor of
transparency.
The amendments were squarely directed at problems of
overclassification in the national security and foreign policy contexts.
82
Senator Baker, in describing his tenure on the Senate Select Committee on
Presidential Campaign Activities, recalled viewing "literally hundreds of
Watergate-related documents that had been classified 'secret' or 'top
secret'.... 95 percent of [them] should not have been classified in the first
place and . . . the Nation's security and foreign policy would not be
damaged in any way by public disclosure of these documents."8 3 To the
Attorney General's concern that the amendments to the FOIA "would shift
the burden to the government," Senator Muskie responded, "[tihe burden
is on the agency to sustain its action." 8 4 The FOIA imposes the burden
because of "the weight of the Federal bureaucracy, which has made it
almost impossible for us to come to grips with secrecy control and limit the
classification process." 8 5 The consensus of the conferees was that the
"burden remains on the Government under this law.",86 The conferees also
discussed, but refused to limit, judicial review of classified material to
determining if the classification decision had a reasonable basis8 and, in
fact, felt that the weight given to agency expertise was meant to be balanced
by the weight any other expert could bring to the debate:
COMM. ON GOV'T OPERATIONS & SUBCOMM. ON ADMIN. PRACTICE & PROCEDURE OF THE
S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 94TH CONG., FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT AND
AMENDMENTS OF 1974 (P.L. 93-502): SOURCE BOOK: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, TEXTS, AND
OTHER DOCUMENTS 306 28 J. Comm. Print 1975) [hereinafter SOURCE BOOK].
82. It is worth noting that the etymology of bureaucracy is the French word, bureau, a
"writing-desk with drawers," and the Greek word for "rule": the tendency to put things
away and shut them up is part of the definition of bureaucracy. See THE OXFORD
DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH ETYMOLOGY 127 (1966).
83. SOURCE BOOK, supra now 81, at 460.
84. Id. at 316, 321.
85. 120 CONG. REC. 17,029 (1974) (statement of Sen. Edmund Muskie).
86. SOURCE BOOK, supra note 81, at 226.
87. S. 2534, 93d Cong. (1974) included the limiting language, but the proposed
language was stricken from the bill by a Senate motion carried by a 56 29 vote. 120 CONG.
REC. 17,022 32.
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Rather, I am saying that I would assume and wish that the judges give such
expert testimony considerable weight. However, in addition, I would also
want the judges to be free to consult such experts in military affairs . . .or
experts on international relations . . . or other experts, and give their
testimony equal weight."
The balance the conferees hoped to achieve in the judicial review
process has not been implemented, as very few FOIA requestors have been
able to overcome the judicial reliance on the mention of "substantial
weight" in the legislative history, notwithstanding the existence of other
balancing language.89 Indeed, the general rule in FOIA cases since 1974
has been that the courts, "lacking expertise in the substantive matters at
hand, must give substantial weight to agency statements, so long as they are
plausible and not called into question by contrary evidence or evidence of
agency bad faith."90 No court seems to have taken up the congressional call
for the use of "other experts," and have simply stated that they lack
expertise.91 Instead, courts have routinely refused to hear the testimony of
other experts. Some examples of experts whose views have been rejected
include a United States Senator who had read the requested document in
his official capacity as a member of the Committee on Foreign Relations,
92
an admiral,93 a former CIA agent,9 4 and a former ambassador who had
88. SOURCE BOOK, supra note 81, at 308.
89. Id.; S. REP. No. 93-1200, at 12 (1974) (Conf. Rep.). The text of the statute reads:
On complaint, the district court ... has jurisdiction to enjoin the agency from
withholding agency records and to order the production of any agency records
improperly withheld from the complainant. In such a case the court shall determine
the matter de novo, and may examine the contents of such agency records in camera
to determine whether such records or any part thereof shall be withheld under any of
the exemptions set forth in subsection (b) of this section, and the burden is on the
agency to sustain its action.
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (2012).
90. Halperin v. CIA, 629 F.2d 144, 149 (D.C. Cir. 1980). For a more recent case, see
Students Against Genocide v. Dep't of State, 257 F.3d 828, 837 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (citing
Halperin, and finding that "the government's assessment is plausible, and as there is no
contrary evidence or evidence of bad faith, we accept its representations.").
91. See, e.g., StudentsAgainst Genocide, 257 F.3d at 837 (holding that because courts lack
expertise in national security matters, they must give "substantial weight to agency
statements" (quoting Halperin, 629 F.2d at 149)).
92. See generaly Washington Post v. U.S. Dep't of Def, No. 84-2949, U.S. Dist. LEXIS
16108 (D.D.C. Feb. 25, 1987) (concerning a staff writer sought to compel the Department of
Defense (DOD) to disclose a report prepared in order to help the Salvadorian government
develop a military strategy), cited in U.S. DEP'T. OFJUSTICE, OFFICE OF INFO. POHICY, GUIDE
TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 150 & n.40 (2009 ed.) [hereinafter FOIA GUIDE
2009].
93. See Hudson River Sloop Clearwater, Inc. v. Dep't of Navy, 891 F.2d 414, 421 22
(2d Cir. 1989) (ruling in favor of the Navy's claim of exemption regarding alleged
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personally prepared some of the records at issue,9" among others. 16 Courts
have "demonstrated deference to agency expertise by according little or no
weight to opinions of persons other than the agency classification
authority."9  Only once has a court actually appointed a special master to
review and categorize classified documents. 98
Nor did passing the 1974 amendments end the political battle. President
Ford vetoed the amendments to the FOIA on the advice of Chief of Staff
Donald Rumsfeld and Deputy Chief of Staff Richard Cheney, who warned
that, among other concerns, the amendments would go too far in allowing
judicial review of classified documents. 99 Antonin Scalia weighed in with
arguments that the amendments were unconstitutional. 100 Congress
overrode the veto. In the debates regarding the veto, Senator Baker
environmental law violations since the judicial branch cannot analyze alleged violations, but
noting that the Navy is subject to congressional environmental laws), cited in FOIA GUIDE
2009, supra note 92, at 150 n.41.
94. See Gardels v. CIA, 689 F.2d 1100, 1106 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (describing a student
sought disclosure of information regarding CIA contacts with a university after the CIA
provided affidavits to establish exemption), cited in FOIA GUIDE 2009, supra note 92, at 150
n.41.
95. See Rush v. Dep't of State, 748 F. Supp. 1548, 1554 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (holding a
former ambassador working on requested documents could be denied information if it was
properly classified), cited in FOIA GUIDE 2009, supra note 92, at 150 n.41.
96. See Pfeiffer v. CIA, 721 F. Supp. 337, 340 41 (D.D.C. 1989) (holding a former CIA
employee can similarly be denied information if it was properly classified), cited in FOIA
GUIDE 2009, supra note 92, at 150 n.41.
97. 1 CORNISH F. HITCHCOCK, GUIDEBOOK TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AND
PRIVACY ACTS 158 59 (2014) (analyzing both the Freedom of Information and Privacy
Acts).
98. In re U.S. Dep't of Def, 848 F.2d 232, 235 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (upholding the District
Court's appointment of a special master (a security-cleared intelligence expert) to create a
representative sample of the withheld documents and to summarize for the court the
arguments each side made or could have made regarding the exemptions). The District
Court judge was dissatisfied with alternative means of document review, including giving the
judge's clerks security clearances so they could review the documents, allowing the
government to prepare a sample index, citing case authority that questioned the impartiality
of government-run sampling, or a purely random sample. Id. at 234. See also Patricia M.
Wald, "Some Exceptional Condition" The Anatomy of a Decision Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
53(), 62 ST.JOHN'S L. REV. 405, 407 08 (1988) (discussing the judge's dissatisfaction with
the alternative means of document review). The special master was ordered to proceed in
Washington Post v. United States Department of Defense, Civ.A No. 84-3400-LFO, 1988 WL
73852, at*1 (D.D.C.June 6, 1988).
99. See Veto Battle 30 Years Ago Set Freedom ofInformation Norms, NAT'L SEC. ARCHIVE (Dan
Lopez et al. eds., Nov. 23, 2004), http://www2.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/
NSAEBB 142 (describing history of FOIA goals and norms).
100. See id. For more detail on the basis of Antonin Scalia's opposition, see generally
Antonin Scalia, The Freedom ofInformation Act Has No Clothes, REG., Mar./Apr. 1982, at 14.
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weighed in on the side of disclosure, stating that the risk that a judge might
"disclose legitimate national security information" was worth bearing as
transparency would help stop "the potential for mischief and criminal
activity." 101 The 1974 FOIA national security amendment was intended to
further access to overclassified documents.102 The hearings and testimony
on the amendment refer to the need to "ensure an informed citizenry, vital
to the functioning of a democratic society, needed to check against
corruption and to hold the governors accountable to the governed." 103 The
debate and the amendment were made in a time, much like our own, when
revelations about the secret machinations of government made daily
headlines, and there was open discussion about the problem of too much
secrecy. But the trend towards secrecy has not abated since 9/11.
As has often been noted, we now live in a state of permanent
emergency. 104 Presidential authority has expanded dramatically in the
national security sphere, and the traditional checks are widely viewed as
ineffective or inappropriate. 10' While there has been some movement
under the Obama Administration toward proactive release of
information, 106 which makes FOIA requests redundant, this has not
occurred in the national security context. The next part discusses some
possible reasons for the courts' unwillingness to participate in enhancing
transparency.
101. SOURCE BOOK, supra note 81, at 461.
102. 120 CONG. REC. 17,029 (1974).
103. NLRB v Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242 (1978).
104. See GIORGIO AGAMBEN, STATE OF EXCEPTION 2 6 (Kevin Attell trans., 2005)
[hereinafter STATE OF EXCEPTION] (arguing that uses of "states of exception" to justify
abuses of power are normal government models); Laura K. Donohue, The Limits of.National
Security, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1573, 1723 32 (2011) (discussing the expansion of national
security and militarism into realms previously unassociated with national security,
including the environment, health, drugs, and crime).
105. See generalyv JACK GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT: THE ACCOUNTABLE
PRESIDENCY AFTER 9/11 (2012) (discussing the increase of presidential power post 9/11
and its relation with legal and political constraints); see also ERIC. A. POSNER & ADRIAN
VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE: SECURITY, LIBERTY, AND THE COURTS 20 (2007)
(denying that courts or judges, as an institutional matter, can improve on executive
decisionmaking during emergencies).
106. See Memorandum on Transparency and Open Government, 3 C.F.R. 338, 338 39
(2009); Memorandum on the Open Government Directive from Peter R. Orszag, Director,





II.JUDICIAL DECISIONMAKING UNDER CONDITIONS OF UNCERTAINTY
Cognitive psychology has identified several ways in which actual
decisionmaking runs counter to the model of the rational, self-interested
person, which forms the basis of so many discussions about legal problem
solving. When making decisions, it turns out, there are a number of distinct
biases that individuals bring to the decisionmaking process; the relevant one
here concerns "availability," the overweighting of information at hand.107
This is a variation of the concept of salience in decisionmaking, which was
popularized by Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman. 108 The availability
heuristic tilts decisionmaking toward "prominent" information, so that
people "rely too heavily on information that is readily available or
prominent, ignoring information that they do not see as often or as readily
or that is in the background." 10' This bias trumps more thoughtful
determinations of frequency and probability. 110 Of particular relevance for
present purposes, it distorts the ability to assess low probability events that
might have "high consequence risks."111
As Stephen Schulhofer has pointed out, "[tihe reasons for judicial
resistance to de novo review, despite the statutory mandate for it, are not
mysterious": judges feel they lack competence and the stakes are too
high.1 2 In the realm of decisionmaking about national security, the stakes
107. See Nobert Schwarz et al., Ease of Retrieval as Information: Another Look at the
Availability Heuristic, 61J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 195, 195 (1991).
108. See generalv AMOS TVLRSKY & DANIEL KAHNEMANN, Introduction to JUDGMENT
UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982);
Deborah H. Schenk, Exploiting the Salience Bias in Designing Taxes, 28 YALEJ. ON REG. 253,
264 66 (2011) (explaining salience bias against transparency and complexity biases and
discusses both in relation to federal income taxes and discrete provisions).
109. Schenk, supra note 108, at 264. Economists' studies have shown that when
something is salient, it had a more pronounced effect on behavior and responses. Id. at 264
65.
110. See Shelley E. Taylor, The Availability Bias in Social Perception and Interaction, in
TVERSKY & KAHNEMAN, supra note 108, at 190, 192 ("Salience biases refer to the fact that
colorful, dynamic, or other distinctive stimuli disproportionately engage attention and
accordingly disproportionately affect judgments."). An example of the salience bias in action
is illustrated by CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 178 79 (1985), where the CIA was allowed to
"withhold superficially innocuous information on the ground that it might enable an
observer to discover the identity of an intelligence source."
111. See generalv Colin F. Camerer & Howard Kunreuther, Decision Processes for Low
Probability Events: Poli Implications, 8 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 565 (1989) (showing how
people misjudge low probability events).
112. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Secrec and Democrac: "ho Controls Information in the National
Security State? 48 (N.Y.U. Sch. of Law, Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series,
Working Paper No. 10-53, 2010), available at papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract id= 1661964.
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of the worst-case scenario that terrorists will, for example, get sufficient
information from the release of any given document to harm national
security trumps the probability or likelihood of that actually happening,
given the vast number of over-classified documents. 113
This is not to maintain that mere probability should be the deciding
factor in a FOIA case, but it should be an element in an analysis by a court
of whether to seriously review a government claim that a document is
properly classified or to undertake an in camera review in order to make
the determination. But the availability heuristic may help explain the
relatively low incidence of disclosure orders or true de novo review,114 and
judicial experience or training does not exempt judges from the effects of
the bias. 115
Regarding the legislative requirement for judicial review of agency
determinations regarding national security, courts have long refused to
entertain requests for de novo review in FOIA cases except in the most
exceptional circumstances, and have generally refused to hear evidence
from outside experts proffered by plaintiffs, even when those experts have
the highest qualifications. 116 Despite clear directives from Congress,
including a direct congressional override of the early judicial adoption of
deference in Exemption One cases, trial courts have in fact exhibited
extreme reluctance to actually make any determinations in these cases that
are contrary to government assertions of national security.11  This seems to
be a classic case of uncertainty in decisionmaking leading to refusal to make
decisions. As Adrian Vermeule notes, in decision theory, "[tihe term
uncertainty is reserved for the class of situations in which the decision
maker knows the payoffs associated with various outcomes but not the
113. See Craig E. Jones, The Troubling .New Science of Legal Persuasion: Heuristics and Biases in
Judicia Decision Making, 41 ADVOCATES' Q. 49, 75 (2013).
114. Id. at 51 (explaining that in cognitive psychology, heuristics are "cognitive shortcuts
that we use as something like defaults in the decision-making process. These heuristics
operate mostly at a sub-conscious level").
115. Id. at 65. Attorneys and judges can be more resistant than the general populace to
a few biases (framing effects and the representative heuristic), but not the ones discussed
here. Id. at 73. Mortality reminders, like those connected with scenarios of terrorism, have
been shown to make judges more "defensive and 'in-group' oriented, and thus more harshly
judgmental of unconventional moral norms." Id. at 63. The in-group (or group to which
the subject belongs) in a FOIA case where the national security exemption is being claimed
would be the government, and the actual classifiers would be a subset of the government,
just as judges are subsets of the government. See id. FOIA requesters, on the other hand, are
the out-group.
116. See supra notes 92 98 and accompanying text.
117. See infra Part IV.
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probability that the possible outcomes will come to pass.""'
This perfectly describes the dilemma faced by courts deciding the FOIA
cases: the judge knows that if the information is suppressed, the public will
not have access to information it is legitimately entitled to know. On the
other hand, if the information is truly properly classified, and its release will
cause damage to the security of the United States, then the goal of
protecting the security of the United States will not be met. Apparently
feeling unable to assess the probability that the release of the information
will damage the security of the United States, the courts have routinely
deferred to the government in situations where hindsight has shown it was
foolish to do so.119 Routine deference immunizes the courts from criticism
if the low probability of large harm occurs. But that still leaves courts
relying on the supposed expertise of government bureaucrats. Relying on
supposed experts can have negative consequences where "the group is
influenced by some selection bias, professional norm, or opinion cascade
that herds the whole group towards one policy option without independent
consideration by (most oD) the group's members." 120
There are, of course, many situations where judges make difficult
decisions and are not seemingly paralyzed by fear of consequences, even in
the national security context. 12 1 The Pentagon Papers case is a prime
example. Relying on both the First and the Fourth Amendments, the
Court in New York Times Co. v. United States refused to restrain the publication
of the Pentagon Papers.12 2 It may have mattered that the Pentagon Papers
were already published, and the sky had not fallen, but the Court had no
trouble balancing national security and civil liberties in that case. Meredith
Fuchs has suggested that the need to confront the First Amendment directly
made the difference in that case. 1 3 But a First Amendment analysis is
118. Adrian Vermeule, Intepreie Choice, N.Y.U. L. REV. 74, 114 (2000) (examining
problems with judicial statutory interpretation).
119. For example, see United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1953), where the
government claimed it would have to reveal state secrets about a plane's spy mechanism for
the case to go forward, but when the report was declassified fifty years later, no national
security secrets were involved, just evidence that the plane malfunctioned. See infra notes
183 185 and accompanying text.
120. Vermeule, supra note 118, at 119.
121. In contexts other than the FOIA, it has been noted that, in the tradeoff between
security and liberty, even if courts feel a lack of expertise in national security, they are
experts in liberty, and so must exercise that expertise in the weighing of the risks and
benefits. See Thomas P. Crocker, "ho Decides on Liberty?, 44 CONN. L. REV. 1511, 1517
(2012).
122. 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971).
123. As Meredith Fuchs has stated:
No clear reason explains why the Court would judge itself more competent to assess
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notably missing from most cases concerning the right to information. The
debate about access to government information and the passage of the
FOIA were taking place at the same time that the Supreme Court was
expanding its First Amendment jurisprudence.
If the FOIA had not been enacted when it was, there might be a more
explicit First Amendment protection of access to government information
as a subset of the constitutionally protected right to receive information. 124
Before the FOIA was passed, scholars looked to the First Amendment to
create a broader right to know about the workings of the government.'2
5
Despite the Supreme Court's continued affirmation of a constitutionally
protected right to receive information,1 2 1 the Court has relied on the FOIA,
not the Constitution, to protect access to most government information.' 
7
Although the right to know about all of the workings of the government
may be implied in the right to petition the government, the Supreme Court
has limited access to government information in the context of considering
the press's constitutional right to information about certain trial
proceedings. 
1 2 8
the need to keep information secret simply because the information had already been
leaked to the press. When faced with the government's request to enjoin publication,
however, the Court had to directly confront the First Amendment. Had the
Pentagon Papers not been leaked, there would have been no First Amendment clash
to resolve secrecy for the purpose of covering up government misrepresentations
would have triumphed.
Meredith Fuchs, Judging Secrets: The Role Courts Should Play in Preventing Unnecessary Secreg, 58
ADMIN. L. REV. 131, 170 (2006).
124. See FOERSTEL, supra note 36, at 66 67; Sullivan, supra note 60, at 17 18.
125. See, e.g., Wallace Parks, The Open Government Principle: Applying the Right to Know Under
the Constitution, 26 GLO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 3 (1957) (discussing constitutional issues relevant to
statutory and presidential action required to create an openly informative government).
126. The Supreme Court has recognized a constitutional right to receive information.
Compare Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 141 42, 147, 149 (1943) (deciding that a local
law prohibiting door-to-door distribution was considered a violation of the constitutional
freedoms of speech and press), with United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194 (2003)
(finding that Congress was permitted to pass an act requiring public libraries to have
Internet filters in order to receive federal subsidies as being designed to meet educational
and informational purposes).
127. One early commenter on the 1974 revisions to the FOIA hoped that the FOIA
would provide a procedural framework to adjudicate the right to know; that has not
happened. See David Mitchell Ivester, The Constitutional Right to Know, 4 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 109, 161 62 (1977) (advocating for injecting a constitutional right to know into the
discussion where national defense and foreign policy claims for withholding information are
made).
128. See Barry P. McDonald, The First Amendment and the Free Flow of-Information: Towards a
Realistic Right to Gather Information in the Information Age, 65 OHIO ST. LJ. 249, 257 302 (2004)
(arguing that jurisprudence disfavors the flow of information in the interest of protecting the
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Congress did in fact give the courts a potentially powerful tool to use to
analyze matters of national security: experts. 29 While individual judges
may not have expertise in matters of national security, even without the
congressional mandate in the FOIA's legislative history, courts have "solid
institutional capacities to elicit expertise." ' "o As Stephen Schulhofer points
out, national security expertise requires balancing two types of institutional
values, secrecy and transparency; and while national security officials abhor
transparency, judges thoroughly understand the values of transparency. 131
Although judges may express a lack of expertise, deciding issues of
national security arises in many contexts. Judges have automatic access to
classified information as an aspect of their status1 32 and review national
security issues under many laws, including the Classified Information
Procedures Act, the Fourth Amendment, and the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act, in addition to the FOIA. 133
The result of the courts' failure to follow the balancing procedures set
out in the FOIA is that the balance has tilted toward excessive secrecy, with
all its attendant ills. The 1974 FOIA amendments made it clear that the
courts were directed to perform substantive reviews of agency claims that
information was properly classified, and that Mink's rubber stamp approval
of agency determinations was not consistent with the purpose of the FOIA.
As David Pozen points out, "[a]bdication, again, exacerbates delegation's
disadvantages as well as its advantages. Legally, delegation threatens
FOIA's principles of segregation and individualized document review; it
undermines the Act's allocations of burdens, if not de novo review itselg
and it violates legislative intent." 134 The incentive provided by the
possibility of rigorous oversight at least some of the time has recently been
called the "observer effect."135 Failure to perform a rigorous oversight
government, academia, or private organizations).
129. SOURCEBOOK, supra note 81, at 308.
130. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Oversight of National Security Secrec in the United States, in
SECREcY, NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE VINDICATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 22, 23
(David Cole et al. eds., 2013).
131. Id.
132. See, e.g., Frederic F. Manget, Another System of Oversight: Intelligence and the Rise ofJudicial
Intervention, 39 STUD. INTELLIGENCE 43, 43 (1996), available at https://www.cia.gov/
library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol39no5/pdf/v39i5a06p.pdf.
133. Id. at46 48.
134. David E. Pozen, Note, The Mosaic Theor, National Securi y, and the Freedom of
Information Act, 115 YALE L.J. 628, 668 (2005) (internal parentheticals omitted).
135. Ashley S. Deeks, The Observer Effect: National Security Litigation, Executive Poli Changes,
and Judicial Deference, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 827, 834 38 (2013) (defining the effects of being
observed by courts on executive policy). The observer effect is in play outside the executive
policy arena. See id. at 834 n.19. An example of the observer effect on agencies would be
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function often enough to make unfavorable court review a factor in agency
determinations disincentivizes agencies from thinking more deeply about
whether or not a document needs to be classified or could be provided despite
classification. 136
The actual impact of court review on agency action might vary,
depending on the agency involved and the frequency of invocation of
Exemption One. Some agencies rarely invoke Exemption One, but others
do so routinely. For example, the Department ofJustice (DOJ), one of the
agencies that make Exemption One claims, received 69,456 FOIA requests
in 2012, and only 408 of those implicated Exemption One (0.01%).137
Within the DOJ, the FBI received 12,783 of those FOIA requests, and 333
involved a claim where Exemption One applied (0.03%). 138 But where the
primary focus of an agency implicates national security, as one might
expect, the percentage of times an agency invokes Exemption One goes up.
The CIA received 3,745 FOIA requests, and claimed Exemption One
applied to 2,112 of them (56%).13§ The NSA received 1809 FOIA requests,
and claimed Exemption One in 1,104 cases (61%). 140 The Defense
Intelligence Agency received 1,144 requests, and claimed Exemption One
applied in 344 of them (30%). 141 The Office of the Director of National
Intelligence received 343 FOIA requests, and claimed that Exemption One
applied in 51 of them (15%). 142 These agencies are necessarily involved in
national security classification and might be more likely to pay attention to
being observed by the courts.
Just because a decision is difficult does not mean that reasoned decisions
can be avoided. Judges make difficult decisions in a variety of contexts,
including those that involve the First Amendment; in these cases, 'Judges
"hard look" judicial review deterring agencies from "implementing policies rashly or without
factual basis." Id. at 853 n. 127.
136. Agencies do not have to claim an exemption where no harm would result from the
disclosure. See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 293 (1979) (discussing agency
discretion to claim exemption or provide documents); see also CNA Fin. Corp. v. Donovan,
830 F.2d 1132, 1133 34 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (explaining that an agency's FOIA disclosure
decision can "be grounded either in its view that none of the FOIA exemptions applies, and
thus that disclosure is mandatory, or in its belief that release is justified in the exercise of its
discretion, even though the data fall within one or more of the statutory exemptions").
137. These percentages were created using FOIA.gov's data generator. Create a Basic
Report, FOIA.Gov, http://www.foia.gov/data.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2014). The data is








are well-suited to recognize interference with the flow of information about
government affairs." 143 There is no reason why judges cannot set up
procedures that will allow them to evaluate the risks associated with
disclosure. 144 Appointing referees, allowing experts to testify on behalf of
disclosure, and creating specialized courts have all been suggested as
possibilities to add some balance to a system that does not recognize the
overwhelming evidence of overclassification or balance the harmful effects
of secrecy against the harmful effects of disclosure. 141
III. OVERCLASSIFICATION AND THE ILLUSION OF AGENCY EXPERTISE
We have seen that courts defer to agency expertise in national security
matters; indeed the legislative history of the 1974 amendments to FOIA
made many references to "substantial deference" to agency expertise in
national security matters. 146 So if in fact there is systemic overclassification,
then deference as a matter of course is troubling: information is not being
released that should be. We suggest that there is overwhelming evidence
that agencies in fact routinely overclassify documents, and that the
motivation for classification arises from an agency culture of secrecy.
Agents sometimes seek to legitimize the superior value of inexpert
information by designating it as "secret." They also use classification to
prevent the exposure of embarrassing and politically volatile information
that has no national security value. 14' This section examines the reasons for
overclassification and the "classification state."
During the 1973 hearings on Executive Privilege, Secrecy in
Government, and Freedom of Information, one of the witnesses was
William G. Florence, a retired Air Force Security Analyst with decades of
experience in reviewing and classifying documents. 148 He stated that
143. Fuchs, supra note 123, at 170.
144. Jd. at 170 71.
145. SOURCEBOOK, supra note 81, at 175, 308.
146. See id. at 308; see, e.g., Lawyers Alliance for Nuclear Arms Control Phila. Chapter
v. Dep't of Energy, 766 F. Supp. 318, 322 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (referring to the legislative history
of the FOIA amendments, stated that "[b]ecause executive departments handling defense
and foreign policy matters have 'unique insights' into the dangers of public exposure, courts
are to 'accord substantial weight to an agency's affidavits concerning the details of the
classified status of a disputed record' (quoting Salisbury v. United States, 690 F.2d 966, 970
(D.C. Cir. 1982) (quoting S. Rep. No. 93-1200, at 12 (1974) (conf rep.)))). The Lawyers
Alliance court cied American Friends Service Committee v. Department ofDefense, 831 F.2d 441, 444
(3d Cir. 1987), which adopted the standard of the D.C. Circuit as stated in Abbotts v. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, 766 F.2d 604, 606 (D.C. Cir. 1985). Lawyers Alliance, 766 F. Supp. at
322.
147. SOURCE BOOK, supra note 81, at 460 61.
148. Mr. Florence served for twenty-two years in the Army and the Air Force, and
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"[there is abundant proof that the false philosophy of classifying
information in the name of national security is the source of most of the
secrecy evils in the executive branch." 
1 4
Mr. Florence listed the most common reasons information is classified,
and none of his eight reasons are related to any actual harm to the security
interests of the United States. The reasons given by Mr. Florence were:
1. Newness of the information;
2. Keep it out of newspapers;
3. Foreigners might be interested;
4. Don't give it away and you hear the old clich6, don't give it to
them on a silver platter;
5. Association of separate nonclassified items;
6. Reuse of old information without declassification;
7. Personal prestige; and
8. Habitual practice, including clerical routine. 150
Mr. Florence is among those experts who have quantified the amount of
properly classified information, and in his opinion, somewhere between
one-half of one percent and five percent of all classified information is in
fact properly classified. 151 Once documents are classified, it can be
extremely difficult to convince an agency to change that classification, even
when the documents have been made public. Mr. Florence gave an
example from the Daniel Ellsberg trial in 1969 regarding twenty documents
that were made a part of the public record during the trial and where
"[the judge specifically ruled that all material introduced as evidence is
public, and that the still-classified documents are available to anyone. Both
departments [Defense and State] have repeatedly refused to cancel the
served twenty-one more years with the Department of Defense in civilian status. For
twenty-six years, his duties included the development and application of policy for classifying
and declassifying official information. From 1971 to 1973, he served as a security consultant
to government contractors in matters involving national defense considerations, and was
associated with the defense in the Ellsberg-Russo Pentagon papers case. Executive Puvilege
Secrec in Government Freedom of Information: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Intergovernmental Relations
of the S. Comm. On Govt Operations, Subcomms. On Separation of Powers & Admin. Practice &
Procedure of the S. Comm. On the Judicary93d Cong. 285 (1973) [hereinafter Executive Pivilege
Hearings] (statement of William G. Florence).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 287.
151. U.S. Government Information Policies and Practices Security Classification Problems Involving
Subsection (b)(1) of the Freedom of Information ofAct (Part 7): Hearings Before the Subcomm. of the H.
Comm. on Govt Operations, 92d Cong. 2296 (1972) [hereinafter Hearings on Security Class[fication
Problems] (statement of William G. Florence).
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classification markings assigned to their respective documents to this
day." 152
A more current example dates from the George W. Bush
Administration, when the Justice Department requested that the Judiciary
Committee remove several letters regarding a government investigation
into claims that important translations were not being done properly prior
to the 9/11 terrorist attacks. 153 The Judiciary Committee removed two of
the letters from its website. 154 It took a lawsuit to get the Justice
Department to admit that retroactive classification was impossible, since the
letters had been already published on the Internet. 155
William J. Leonard, retired head of the Information Security Oversight
Office, has noted that, although no document may be classified to "conceal
violations of law, prevent embarrassment to a person or agency, restrain
competition, or delay the release of declassifiable information,"' 156 no one
has ever been disciplined for violating these provisions. Leonard's agency
had responsibility for enforcing classification policy throughout the
government and under the National Industrial Security Program. 151
There is evidence that, despite the clear directives in executive orders on
classification, agencies routinely use classification for every one of the
prohibited reasons. The Church Reports were not the last major
congressional report on excessive secrecy and improper classification.
152. Executive Privilege Hearings, supra note 148, at 287.
153. Class[fied Letters Regarding FBI Thistleblower Sibel Edmonds, MEMORY HOLE,
https://web.archive.org/web/20090317040641/http://www.thememoryhole.org/spy/edm
onds letters.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2014); Chris Strohm, Lawsuits Challenge Justice Effort to
Classiy Previous/v Public Information, GOV'T EXECUTIVE June 28, 2004),
http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0604/062804c 1 .htm.
154. Strohm, supra note 153.
155. Stipulation of Dismissal, Project on Gov't Oversight v. Gonzales, C.A. No.
1:04cv1032 (D.D.C. Mar. 9, 2005), available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/
stipdismissalasfiled.pdf, see also Letter from Vesper Mei, U.S. Dep't. ofJustice, to Michael T.
Kirkpatrick, Pub. Citizen Litig. Grp. (Feb. 18, 2005), available at http://www.citizen.
org/documents/2-18-05letter.pdf (acknowledging that the letters are "releasable in full,
pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act").
156. See Bill Weaver, State Secrets and the Temptations for Misuse, NAT'L SEC. ADVISORS:
NAT'L SEC. L. BLOG (May 22, 2007, 1:32 PM), http://natseclaw.
typepad.com/matseclaw/2007/05/paving-the-road.html; see also Exec. Order No. 13,526
§ 1.7(a)(1) (2), (4), 3 C.F.R. 298, 302 (2009). Bill Weaver asked William Leonard, then the
head of the Information Security Oversight Office, the office responsible to the President for
policy and oversight of the government-wide security classification system and the National
Industrial Security Program, whether anyone had ever been disciplined for violating the
Executive Order. Weaver, supra note 156. No one could remember a single instance of
discipline, despite the fact that there "are three million derivative classifiers." Id.
157. Weaver, supra note 156.
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Daniel Patrick Moynihan, the Chairman of the 1997 Commission on
Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy, stated that using the
"sources and methods ' approach of classifying information has meant
that how the information is obtained, not the content of the information, is
a major determinant of classification; almost everything that an intelligence
agency collects, including information from open sources, is automatically
classified:1' this meant that "in 1995 there were 21,871 'original' Top
Secret designations and 374,244 'derivative' designations."16 0  Senator
Moynihan asked: "can there really have been some 400,000 secrets created
in 1995, the disclosure of any one of which would cause 'exceptionally
grave damage to the national security'?"" 1
To bring these numbers more up to date, in 2011, there were 127,072
original classifications, 6 2 and over 50 million derivative classifications made
in 2010, the last year for which there are figures.16 3 To update Senator
Moynihan's question, can there really have been over 50 million secrets
created in 2010, the disclosure of any one of which would have caused
exceptionally grave damage to the national security?
In 1993, then-Senator John F. Kerry of Massachusetts made a comment
regarding classified documents reviewed by the Select Committee on
POW/MIA Affairs. He stated: "I do not think more than a hundred, or a
couple of hundred, pages of the thousands of documents we looked at had
any current classification importance, and more often than not they were
documents that remained classified or were classified to hide negative
political information, not secrets." 164
Daniel Moynihan relied on Max Weber's theories about bureaucracy
when he framed secrecy as a pernicious form of regulation:
Max Weber, who first set forth, over eight decades ago, that secrecy was a
normal mode by which bureaucracies conduct their business....
Rulemaking was the distinctive mode of bureaucracy. We came to call it
158. National Security Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-253, § 102(d)(3), 61 Stat. 495
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 50 U.S.C.).
159. S. Doc. No. 105-2, at XXVII (1997).
160. Id. at XXIX ("Many of these 'derivative' designations involve 'sources and
methods,' one of the subjects concerning intelligence mentioned in the National Security Act
of 1947. A report about troop movements might reveal that we have satellite photography
in the region; such like matters.").
161. Id.
162. OPENTHEGOVERNMENT.ORG, 2012 SECRECY REPORT: INDICATORS OF SECRECY
IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 20 (2012), http://www.openthegovemment.org/
sites/defauh/files/Secrecy2012_web.pdf. The government did not release the number of
derivatively classified documents in 2011. Id. at 21.
163. Id. at 23.
164. S. Doc. No. 105-2, at XXXI XIXXII.
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regulation. If the present report is to serve any large purpose, it is to
introduce the public to the thought that secrecy is a mode of regulation. 165
The default mode of security bureaucracies is secrecy; when a decision
needs to be made about whether or not to classify something as secret,
there are implicit rules and norms in place that favor overclassification.
Institutionalized rules and norms can be followed unthinkingly until some
feedback from above lets people know the rules and norms are not working
properly, and for agencies, judicial constraints on decisionmaking are a way
to signal that specific types of decisions will not pass statutory muster. 166
There are sound reasons for curtailing excessive overclassification.
There are many dangers from excessive secrecy. Regarding the dangers
of hiding things from the public, Senator Moynihan noted that in the 1960s
and 1970s, scientists were clear that overclassification of scientific evidence
was actually a danger to America's national security, as it "deprive [s] the
country of the lead time that results from the free exchange of ideas and
information" and that the amount of technical information that was
overclassified or improperly classified was as much as 90%. 161
The range of estimates for the amount of overclassification varies, but
the fact that massive overclassification exists does not. Many of the
estimates of overclassification have been made by people with years of
experience in the government. The fact that there is a consensus that a
large percentage of what is classified need not be classified should change
the risk analysis for judicial review. When determining the likelihood of an
event happening, courts should not be insensitive to the prior probability of
the outcome. If there is a likelihood that, to be conservative, 50% of
documents are not properly classified, that probability needs to be taken
into account when determining the likelihood that a claim of exemption
should be reviewed by the court or should be treated with skepticism, or
that releasing a particular document will cause a major national security
harm. Failure to do so causes judges to overestimate the probability that
the document is properly classified and those properly classified
documents are the only documents Exemption One protects from
disclosure.168 The Moynihan Report points out the resulting harm of this
165. Id. at XXXVI.
166. See Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing Social Conformity, and Judicial Review of Agenc
Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 486, 493 94 (2002). The other methods include a crisis
calling the rule into question, a new leadership with new ways, or congressional or
presidentially imposed constraints. Id. Some combination of these methods have all been
relied upon to intervene in the bureaucracy of secrecy, to little apparent effect to date. See id.
167. S. Doc. No. 105-2, atapp. A-61.
168. Cf Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment under Uncertainy: Heuristics and
Biases, 185 Sci. 1124 (1974) (observing failure of decisionmaking because of heuristics and
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practice: "One legacy of a century of real and imagined conspiracy, most of
it cloaked in secrecy, is that the American public has acquired a distrust of
government almost in proportion to the effort of government to attempt to
be worthy of trust." 1"9
Of course, not everyone associated with the government is dissatisfied
with the way in which the federal courts have interpreted the congressional
mandate for muscular review of claims that national security exempts
documents in FOIA disclosure; there are those who believe that the
Executive's mandate to control national security should not be interfered
with by the Judiciary. 70 The argument that documents cannot be released
because of national security concerns is not, of course, limited to the FOIA.
Many fascinating examples of claims of national security that have turned
out to be false come from cases outside the FOIA, such as the state secret
claim in Edmonds v. Department of justice, 171 where the government
retroactively classified documents that had been available on the U.S.
Senate website. 172
An earlier example of a claim that turned out to be valid was at issue in
the case of New York Times v. United States, 171 in which then-Solicitor General
Erwin N. Griswold argued that disclosure would pose the threat of serious
injury to the national security. 174 Mr. Griswold later recanted:
I have never seen any trace of a threat to the national security from the
publication. Indeed, I have never seen it even suggested that there was such
biases).
169. S. Doc. No. 105-2, at app. A-75. The recent Snowden disclosures have raised a
storm of distrust, even though the government has claimed legal legitimacy for some of its
actions; the secrecy itself is part of the problem. See infia note 206.
170. See, e.g., Mark Fenster, The Opacity of Transparen, 91 IOWA L. REV. 885, 907 08
(2006). See generaly Laura A. White, The Needfor Governmental Secrec: "hy the US. Government
Must Be Able to Withhold Information in the Interest of National Secu , 43 VA.J. INT'L L. 1071
(2003).
171. Edmonds v. Dep't ofJusdice, 161 F. App'x. 6 (D.C. Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S.
1031 (2005). Sibel Edmonds was a CIA translator who claimed she was fired for
whisdeblowing; her case was dismissed, despite evidence that her allegations were true and
that she had been fired for whisdeblowing. See generaly U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, OFFICE OF
THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, OFFICE OF OVERSIGHT AND REVIEW, A REVIEW OF THE FBI's
ACTIONS IN CONNECTION WITH ALLEGATIONS RAISED BY CONTRACT LINGUIST SIBEL
EDMONDS: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY (2005), available at http://www.justice.gov/oig/special
/0501/final.pdf.
172. Anne E. Kornblut, Translator in Eye of Storm on Retroactive Class[fication, Bos. GLOBE,
July 5, 2004, http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2004/07/O5/translator
in-eye of storn on retroactive classification/?page=full.
173. See discussion supra note 45.
174. Brief for the United States at 18, N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713
(1971) (No. 1873), 1971 WL 167581.
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an actual threat. Sen. Gravel's edition is now almost completely forgotten,
and I doubt if there is more than a handful of persons who have ever
undertaken to examine the Pentagon Papers in any detail either with
respect to national security or with respect to the policies of the country
relating to Vietnam. "'
It quickly becomes apparent to any person who has considerable
experience with classified material that there is massive overclassification
and that the principal concern of the classifiers is not with national security,
but rather with governmental embarrassment of one sort or another.
There may be some basis for short-term classification while plans are being
made, or negotiations are going on, but apart from details of weapons
systems, there is very rarely any real risk to current national security from
the publication of facts relating to transactions in the past, even the fairly
recent past. "This is the lesson of the Pentagon Papers experience, and it
may be relevant now." 116
The government can use national security as a trump card in litigation,
and has been doing so for quite some time. Bill Weaver worked for the
NSA for nine years, and reviewed and created classified information as a
daily part of his job.1 7 Speaking in the context of the state secrets privilege,
he called for oversight, as he had "no doubt [the privilege] is often
abused." 178 He "observed and personally engaged in abuse of
overclassification and saw unclassified items classified in order to prevent
their disclosure. These problems are rampant and seemingly incurable." '
There are no apparent penalties for classifying things for the improper
reasons set out in executive orders. According to Weaver, the
"classification of unclassified material and overclassification are actions that
are viewed favorably by managers. If one does or claims otherwise one will
not have a job very long." 80 In the face of his personal knowledge of
improper and overclassification, Weaver states that "there is no reason that
judges should treat claims of classification and dangers that will occur from
disclosure as sober judgments made in the best interests of the country." 181
Too often, Weaver notes, it is politics, personal concerns, and fear of
embarrassment that lead to classification decisions. 182 Retired Admiral
175. Erwin N. Griswold, Secrets Not Worth Keeping: The Courts and Classjfied Information,
WASH. POST, Feb. 15, 1989, atA25.
176. Id.




181. Id. (emphasis added).
182. Id.
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Gene La Rocque testified in 1972 hearings before the Foreign Operations
and Government Information Subcommittee about the reasons why the
military overclassified information:
Other reasons for classifying material are: to keep it from other military
services... from civilians in the Defense Department, from the State
Department, and of course, from the Congress. Sometimes, information is
classified to withhold it for later release to maximize the effect on the public
or the Congress. Frequently, information is classified so that only portions of
it can be released selectively to the press to influence the public or the
Congress. "'
Just recently, the nominee for Director of National Intelligence, Admiral
Dennis C. Blair, admitted:
[t]here is a great deal of over-classification .... Some of it, I think, is done
for the wrong reasons, to try and hide things from the light of day. Some of
it is because in our system, there is no incentive not to do that, and there are
penalties to do the reverse, in case you get something wrong and don't
classify it. 134
As Steven Aftergood, who directs the Federation of American Scientists
Project on Government Secrecy, has noted, it is not that government
officials cannot follow the procedural rules for classifying information; it is
that their "subjective 'determination' that classification is necessary" is an
"error in judgment." 181
This culture of excessive secrecy is the reason that Congress asked the
Judiciary to balance claims of secrecy with common sense, expert
testimony, and careful review. The courts have not complied. One small
part of the problem is that judges do not understand what agencies do
183. Hearings on Security Class[fication Problems, supra note 151, at 2909 10.
184. Steven Aftergood, Blair: Intel Classification Poli. Needs "Fundamental Work," SECRECY
NEWS Jan. 26, 2009), http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/2009/01/blair/. During
questioning, Blair pledged to use classification policy "only to protect national security and
not to manipulate public opinion or frame or mis-frame political debates[.]" Id.
185. Steven Aftergood, Inspector General Class[fication Reviews Due in September, SECRECY
NEWS (July 8, 2013), http://fas.org/blogs/secrecy/20 13/0 7/ig-reviews-due/. "Thus, for
example, when an agency's classification judgment is overruled by the Interagency Security
Classification Appeals Panel ... which happens with some frequency-it is not because of
an error in procedure but because of an error in judgment." Id. The vagaries of judgment
are illustrated by one author's experience with the FOIA: "In many of the documents I
obtained through the Freedom of Information Act, the redactions by government censors
made little sense. Exactly the same information would be supplied in one document, yet
blacked out in another." ERIC SCHLOSSER, COMMAND AND CONTROL: NUCLEAR




when they classify information, according to Alex Rossmiller. 186 Mr.
Rossmiller worked at the Defense Intelligence Agency and knows that
documents' classification is often done so that others will take the
information more seriously.18 For judges reviewing documents that the
government claims are properly classified, it is important to understand the
conditional language of classification. This refers to the use of
phrases such as wejudge, we assess, and we estimate-and probabilistic terms
such as probably and likely [are used] to convey analytical assessments and
judgments. Such statements are not facts, proof, or knowledge. These
assessments and judgments generally are based on collected information,
which often is incomplete or fragmentary. Some assessments are built on
previous judgments. In all cases, assessments and judgments are not
intended to imply that we have "proof' that shows something to be a factor
that definitively links two items or issues. 18
In other words, judges should take the information they review with a
grain of salt. Mr. Rossmiller advises that when assessing protected
information, courts should: review the information in question; apply
appropriate skepticism; and examine source material. 189 But while Mr.
Rossmiller tells us that the language of much classified information is
inherently "conditional," and that healthy skepticism is needed when
reviewing it, there is another surprising countervailing force.
An even healthier dose of judicial skepticism may be necessary to
overcome this force: the secrecy heuristic. A recent study at the University
of Colorado at Boulder offered an additional twist to the overclassification
issue: in matters relating to foreign policy, when people are told that a
document is secret, they are statistically more likely to believe its contents
are true. 10 The study is based on three different experiments that looked at
186. See, Alex Rossmiller, Adjudicating Classified Information, 85 ST.JOHN'S L. REV. 12 7 5,
1277 (2011).
187. Id. at 1295 96.
188. Id. at 1314 & n.153 (quoting OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT'L INTELLIGENCE,
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE: IRAN: NUCLEAR INTENTIONS AND CAPABILITIES 5
(2007), available at http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Reports / 20and / 20
Pubs/2007 1203_release.pdf.
189. See id. at 1316 23. There have been instances where courts, outside the FOIA
context, have done this. In Parhat v. Gates, the court found the documents purporting to be
actual evidence that Parhat was an enemy combatant were suffused with so many caveats,
that there was no actual evidence. 532 F.3d 834, 846 47 (D.C. Cir. 2008). Also, in
Boumediene v. Bush, the district court found that despite voluminous evidence preferred by the
government, the status of the defendants as enemy combatants was based on one
unsupported claim from an unnamed source. 579 F. Supp. 2d 191, 197 (D.D.C. 2008).
190. Mark Travers et al., The Secrec Heuristic: _Inferring Quali y fom Secrec in Foreign Poli
Contexts, 35 POL. PSYCHOL. 97, 106, 108 (2014).
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secrecy from a citizen, rather than an institutional, point of view.19 1 The
study found that secret information is weighed more heavily than public
information; secret information is believed to be of higher quality than
public information; and decisions made on the basis of secret information
are judged more favorably than decisions made on the basis of public
information. 1'2 The heuristic fills in for an ability to actually assess the target
attribute of information: people use secrecy to fill in for quality when there
is, in fact, no difference between the supposedly secret and the supposedly
open information. 193 If judges are, like the rest of us, subject to the secrecy
heuristic, they are just as likely to treat claims of secrecy as a signal of the
quality of information. 1 4 If the information is believed more likely to be
true, judges may find it easier to believe the information was properly
classified. Furthermore, since the same agency that produced the
presumptively true information is resisting disclosure, a judge may be more
likely to ascribe veracity to the claim that disclosure would cause harm.
Without training for judges to ignore the heuristic, the secrecy heuristic
would improperly favor an agency's claim that information is properly
classified, further reducing judicial incentives to actually evaluate whether
or not the information was properly classified.
It has certainly been anecdotally true that judges have failed to use Mr.
Rossmiller's suggested "grain of salt." The Sibel Edmonds case provides an
interesting example.1"' A federal judge refused to let Sibel Edmonds, the
government translator involved in a whistleblower suit, answer questions
that could not plausibly have had a serious national security implication:
"When and where were you born?"; "Where did you go to school?"; "What
did you focus your studies on in school?""1 The most famous case is, of
course, the case that gave judicial allowance to a state secrets privilege. In
United States v. Reynolds, the government successfully terminated the tort
191. Jd. at 98.
192. Id. at 98 99. The article speculates that in institutions with cultures of secrecy, such
as the CIA, the heuristic may be even more prevalent. Id. at 108.
193. Jd. at 99.
194. See id.
195. See generaly Edmonds v. United States, 436 F. Supp. 2d 28 (D.D.C. 2006).
Although Edmonds is a state secrets case, the judicial analysis for disclosure or nondisclosure
in state secrets cases applies to FOIA cases. See Halkin v. Helms, 598 F.2d 1, 9 (D.C. Cir.
1978) (providing an analogous intrpretation of the national security exemption to the FOIA
and the state secrets privilege); see also Pozen, supra note 134, at 639 (noting that state secrets
cases and FOIA Exemption One cases are "analogous") (quoting Halkin, 598 F.2d at 9).
196. Anthony Rapa, Comment, "hen Secrec Threatens Security: Edmonds v. Department
of Justice and a Proposal to Reform the State Secrets Privilege, 37 SETON HALL L. REV. 233, 268
n.279 (2006) (criticizing the use of the state secrets privilege and the increase of national
security within context of the Edmonds case).
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claim by the widow of a spy plane pilot killed in a plane crash, claiming that
it would have to reveal state secrets about the plane's spy mechanism for
the case to go forward.19  In 2000, the report the government withheld was
declassified.9 8 When the report was declassified, Mrs. Reynolds's daughter
sued for fraud, alleging that there were no national security secrets
involved just evidence that the plane malfunctioned.' Every historian
has a list of ludicrous secrets, according to Ted Gup,2 0 0 and the 'James
Madison Project's list is as good as any: on it is a Pentagon report classified
'top secret' that criticizes the excessive use of classification in the military"
and a formula for invisible ink for World War 1.201
The dangers of openness and disclosure are frequently exaggerated.0 2
There were no repercussions from the leak of the Pentagon Papers,2 0 3 and
the repercussions from the biggest leak of all, Wikileaks, have generally
been more evident in the press's imagination than in reality.20 4 The leaks
197. 345 U.S. 1, 1 (1953). Although Rynolds is usually credited as the origin of the states
secret doctrine, Laura Donohue has traced it much further back. See Laura K. Donohue,
The Shadow of State Secrets, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 77, 82-85 (2010).
198. Herring v. United States, 424 F.3d 384, 387 (3d Cir. 2005); see Jess Bravin, High
Court to Consider State Secrets Doctrine, WALL ST. J., Jan. 18, 2011,
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB 10001424052748704029704576088253308626870
(stating that the crash report, later declassified, said negligence caused the crash and did not
contain electronics secrets).
199. Herring v. Unied States, No. 03-CV-5500-LDD, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18545, at
*6 7 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 10, 2004).
200. Ted Gup, Nation of Secrets: The Threat to Democracy and the American Way of
Life 111 (2007) (EXPLORING HOW AND WHY ACADEMIC, GOVERNMENT, AND BUSINESS
INSTITUTIONS KEEP SECRETS FROM THE PEOPLE).
201. Id.; see Litation Files, JAMES MADISON PROJECT, http://www.jamesmadison
project.org/litigation.php (last visited Oct. 28, 2014).
202. Even in an arena where there is strong appeal to the proposition that secrecy is
required, such as the operational details of our nuclear weapon, news reports about classified
safety problems with the United States's missile program forced the government to
implement crucial safety measures. COMMAND AND CONTROL, supra note 185, at 466 68.
203. Griswold, supra note 175 ("I have never seen any trace of a threat to the national
security from the publication. Indeed, I have never seen it even suggested that there was
such an actual threat.").
204. At the time of the leaks by Bradley Manning, then Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton accused his leak of 250,000 diplomatic cables of being "an attack on the
international community" that "puts people's lives in danger, threatens our national security
and undermines our efforts to work with other countries to solve shared problems." Clinton
Condemns Leaks as Attack on the International Communiy,' CNN, Nov. 30, 2010, http://www.
cnn.com/2010/US/I 1/29/wikileaks/. But Clinton also "expressed confidence that U.S.
diplomatic efforts will survive the leak of the documents, whose authenticity she would not
confirm but which lay out in detail the diplomatic sausage-making that is usually hidden
from public view." Id. Sausage-making is embarrassing, not a danger to the national
security. Amid many claims that the Wikileaks documents caused the death of innocent
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have certainty caused spectacular embarrassment, but embarrassment is
specifically excluded as a reason for classification. 0 ' The recent Snowden
leaks have likewise been an embarrassment, and have led to extensive and
difficult conversations at the national and international levels.2 0 ' The leaks
have also led to a rash of affirmative releases of previously classified
information by the government and have opened a public debate that even
the current Director of National Intelligence believes is a step in the right
direction. 20 In the wake of the leaks, the Director of the National
people, two claims persisted the longest. One claim regarded the death of Majid Fashi. See
Sam Ser, Did a Wikileaks Document Doom Iranian 'Massad Agent'?, TIMES ISR., May 16, 2012,
http://www.imesofisrael.com/wikileaks-report-may-have-doomed-iranian-mossad-agent/.
But the story about Majid Fashi was not true. Andy Greenberg, Wikileaks: No, Media
'Morons,' We Didn't Help Iran Execute an Israeli Spy, FORBES, May 16, 2012,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/20 12/05/ 16/wikileaks-no-media-morons-
we-didnt-help-iran-execute-an-israeli-spy/. The "Afghan Diaries" allegedly put the security
of military contacts in Afghanistan at risk. WikiLeaks Accused of Murder, CBS EVENING NEWS
July 29, 2010, 7:03 PM) http://www.cbsnews.com/videos/wikileaks-accused-of-murder/
("Pentagon officials are accusing the WikiLeaks website and the source of the 'Afghan
Diaries' of murder for jeopardizing the security of military contacts in Afghanistan."). But
there has been no proof, the government has conceded. See, e.g., Nancy A. Youssef, Officials
May be Overstating the Danger from WikiLeak/4 McCLATCHY DC, Nov. 28, 2010,
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2010/11/28/104404/officials-may-be-overstating-the.html
(remarking that despite similar warnings ahead of the previous two massive releases of
classified U.S. intelligence reports by the website, U.S. officials concede that they have no
evidence to date that the documents led to anyone's death). See generaly Chase Madar,
Accusing Wikileaks of Murder, THE NATION, Jan. 19, 2012, http://www.thenation.com/
article/ 165758/accusing-wikileaks-murder# (documenting that no deaths can be traced to
the Wikileaks revelations); Mark Hosenball, US Officials Privatefy Say Wikileaks Damage Limited,
REUTERS, Jan. 18, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/01 / 18/wikileaks-damage-
idUSN1816319120110118.
205. See Griswold, supra note 175; see also Exec. Order No. 13,526 § 1.7(a)(2), 3 C.F.R.
298, 302 (2009).
206. See Dilanian, supra note 3; Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: 2013 Leaks and
Declassijfications, LAWFARE (Oct. 1, 2013, 4:13 PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/wiki/nsa-
papers/ (providing a timeline of leaks and declassifications). The response to the Snowden
leaks calls to mind the findings of the comments of the joint Committee on Government
Operations and the Committee on theJudiciary. SOURCE BOOK, supra note 81, at 13 ("[in
fact, years of study by this committee show each new administration develops its own special
secrecy techniques which, as time passes, become more and more sophisticated. The factor
of credibility, together with the inclination of government to invade the privacy of our
citizens, poses an ominous threat to our democratic system which must be opposed at every
turn despite the agony it might create. We believe it is better to have too much freedom
than too little.").
207. Dilanian, supra note 3. James Clapper, the current Director of National
Intelligence, speaking about the Snowden leaks of information about a FISA court order,
said: "I think it's clear that some of the conversations this has generated, some of the debate,
actually needed to happen. If there's a good side to this, maybe that's it." Id.
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Counterterrorism Center from 2007 to 2011 called for intelligence agencies
to be "'aggressive' about reducing classification," noting that excessive
classification has eroded public trust in the whole secrecy regime. 2 8 When
President Obama appointed a committee, the President's Review Group on
Intelligence and Communications Technology, the Committee stated that
"[a] central goal of [their] recommendations is to increase transparency
and to decrease unnecessary secrecy."2 0' 9 The courts have a role to play in
making sure that if the government is indulging in excessive classification,
which is in fact excessive secrecy, that the government does not get away
with it.
IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
To illuminate how courts have balanced national security and civil liberties,
this Article includes an empirical investigation into the decisionmaking of
the federal courts. What circumstances or combination of circumstances
are likely to result in a FOIA requester getting all or some disputed
documents that have been withheld pursuant to the national security or
foreign policy exemption? Are there any lessons in these cases to help
judges overcome their bias? Are there any prescriptive measures for
assuring that overclassification does not preclude rational decisionmaking
and hamper the open debate necessary to democratic governance?10
We initially chose to look at all of the FOIA cases decided by the trial
and appellate courts in the D.C. Circuit from 1974 to 2012. To increase
the number of appellate cases in the statistical analysis, we expanded the
pool of cases to include all appellate cases in the country. Focusing special
attention on the trial court cases in the District of Columbia makes some
sense in this context. Thirty-eight percent of all FOIA cases filed from
1979 to 2008 were filed in the District Court for District of Columbia,
according to a recent statistical analysis of the Federal Judicial Center
208. Steven Aftergood, Declassjication as a Confidence Building Measure, SECRECY NEWS
(Dec. 16, 2013), http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/2013/12/121613.html.
209. See LIBERTY AND SECURITY IN A CHANGING WORLD, supra note 8, at 80.
210. To our knowledge, only one other study has taken an empirical look at FOIA cases.
In 2002, Paul R. Verkuil looked at all FOIA cases decided in the 1990s to test whether the
de novo standard of review was being followed by the courts in FOIA cases; de novo review
is the most stringent standard of review, and the author expected reversal rates of close to
50%. See Paul R. Verkuil, An Outcomes Analysis of Scope of Review Standards, 44 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 679, 713 (2002). The actual reversal rate for Exemption One cases where Exemption
One was the only exemption claimed was 10.8%, and it was 11.3% where Exemption One
was one of several exemptions claimed. Id. at 735. Interestingly, the reversal rate was just
over 10% regardless of which exemption was claimed. Id. at 713. This is much more like
"committed to agency discretion." Id. at 715.
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database.2 1 1 The D.C. Circuit has more FOIA litigation than any other
circuit court, deciding 38% of all appellate FOIA cases nationally.
2 1 2
A. Data and Analysis
To evaluate the determinants of successful invocation of the national
security exemption, we created a dataset of all reported federal cases in the
D.C. federal courts at the district and appellate level that considered the
exemption, along with all appellate cases.21 3 This produced a dataset of
270 cases, of which 163 were at the district level and 107 at the appellate
level. For each of these cases, we analyze characteristics of the plaintiff, the
claim itself, the treatment of the claim by the court, the characteristics of
the judge or panel, and the ultimate outcome of disclosure or withholding
disclosure. We describe these variables here.
Plaintiff type: For plaintiff type, we examine whether or not the named
plaintiff is a non-governmental organization (NGO) or an individual. We
recognize, of course, that the named plaintiff imperfectly correlates with the
actual party in interest. We also examine whether the plaintiff has been
involved in more than one suit in our database.
Nature of the claim: In terms of the claim itself, we examine whether
Exemption One was invoked on the basis of national security, foreign
affairs, or both. Because the FOIA allows the government to claim
multiple exemptions in refusing to disclose certain documents, we also
identify any other exemptions that were invoked in the case. Eighty-five
percent of cases involved another exemption besides Exemption One. The
most commonly invoked was Exemption Three (documents specifically
211. Kwoka, supra note 14, at 261. To put the volume of FOIA cases the D.C. District
Court disposes of in perspective, the D.C. Circuit disposes of only 1.3% of all district court
litigation.
212. Data on file with authors; see also Kwoka, supra note 14, at 261; Patricia M. Wald,
... Doctor, Lawye, Merchant, Chief," 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1127, 1147 (1992) (analyzing
the evolution of panel courts' change and effect on jurisprudence via presidential
appointment).
213. To identify cases, we conducted searches in the Wesdaw and Lexis databases for
Freedom of Information Act cases that mentioned "Exemption one" or "Exemption 1" or
the "national security exemption," then manually screened out cases that did not rely on the
relevant exemption. We considered doing a PACER docket search for more unreported
cases, but are not convinced that such a search would be systematic enough to obtain a
reliable sample, or that the time involved in the manual review required would be repaid.
We acknowledge that not all cases are reported in the Wesdaw and Lexis databases, and
that not all cases reach the level of a written decision. But the Wesdaw and Lexis databases
can be searched using complex Boolean searches, and both cover the entire period of our
analysis. Because the number of appellate cases in the D.C. Circuit dataset was relatively
small, we expanded the appellate analysis to include all circuit courts of appeals.
20141
ADMINISTATIVE LAW REVEW
exempted by other statutes) followed by Exemption Seven (law
enforcement) and Exemption Five (privileged internal or inter-agency
documents). There were no cases invoking Exemptions Eight or Nine,
which are narrow exceptions for, respectively, securities and oil and gas.
Other case variables: We also ask whether or not the case included a
Vaughn Index prepared by the agency; whether the court ordered in
camera review; and whether the court discussed the sufficiency of the
affidavit.
judge and panel characteristics: Finally, in terms of judge and panel
characteristics, we ask whether the judge was appointed by a Democrat or
Republican. In the case of appellate panels, we identify the composition of
the panel by political party of the appointing president.
Outcome: We coded cases as leading to full disclosure, which is counted as
a victory for the plaintiff; partial disclosure, in which some requested
documents are disclosed; and non-disclosure, which is coded as a victory for
the government. We note whether there was a remand in the decision.
Table 1 provides summary statistics, with appellate panel composition in
Table 3 in the next section. Note the rarity of an outright win by the
plaintiff. Only 5 6% of all FOIA cases lead to full disclosure. Trial courts
are less likely than appellate courts to grant some form of disclosure.
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Table 1: Summary statistics




Plaintiff Individual Plaintiff .73 .68 .79
Characteristics NGO or Other Plaintiff .27 .32 .21
Exception Foreign Affairs .40 .20 .68
Exception
National Defense .86 .91 .78
Exception
Other Exemptions (all .85 .88 .80
categories)
Exemption 2 .20 .27 .11
Exemption 3 .58 .64 .50
Exemption 4 .05 .08 .01
Exemption 5 .31 .46 .12
Exemption 6 .27 .35 .16
Exemption 7 .41 .46 .34
Treatment by Court In Camera .38 .37 .39
Vaughn Index .51 .59 .39
Sufficiency of Affidavit .72 .77 .64
Discussed
Leg. Hist. Discussed .11 .03 .21
Leg. Hist. Discussed as .05 .01 .11
Basis for Disclosure
Judge/Panel Trial Judge Party .41 .58
Characteristics democrat
Appellate Panel Majority .55 N/A .55
or All Democrat
Appointee
Outcome Outcome Gov't Wins .79 .74 .88
Outcome Partial .14 .06 .35
Outcome Plaintiff .05 .04 .11
Outcome 2 or 3 .15 .09 .23
(Disclosure or Partial)
Outcome Includes .17 .01 .66
Remand
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B. District Court Results
To understand the impact of these factors on case outcomes, we estimate
a series of logistic regression models, reported in Table 2.214 The
dependent variable in each model is the case outcome, coded "1" if the
plaintiff secured a full or partial win, and "0" otherwise. We aggregate full
and partial victory because the number of cases in which a plaintiff won the
case outright was very small (6 out of 163 district cases for which an
outcome was identifiable). 2 5 Thus, coefficients with a positive sign indicate
a greater probability of disclosure. Note that several cases fall out of the
analysis because of missing data.
Our first model included only case characteristics. We examine whether
the exemption invoked foreign affairs, and whether there were any other
exemptions claimed in addition to Exemption One. We also examine
whether or not the government prepared a Vaughn Index, whether or not
the court examined the affidavit in camera, and whether or not the case
discusses the sufficiency of the affidavit. The second model adds
characteristics of the party. We examine whether the plaintiff was an NGO
as opposed to an individual (n=58), and whether the plaintiff is found in
more than one of the cases in the dataset (repeat plaintifi) (n= 109). Our
hypothesis is that NGOs and repeat plaintiffs will have greater resources to
bring to bear, and will also have better information to select winning
cases. 216
The majority of cases in the data are brought against four government
agencies: the CIA (55); the FBI (20); the Department of State (29); and the
DOJ (36). We expect that these repeat defendants will be in a good
position to settle cases they are likely to lose, and hence will have a better
"win-rate." Hence, we include a dummy variable for cases in which the
government defendant is an agency other than those four (n=60). We
predict this variable will be associated with greater likelihood of plaintiff
victory. Of course, many of the DOJ cases will in fact involve a defendant
214. Logit regression models are appropriate when the dependent variable here, the
case outcome-is binary.
215. These cases were: Center for International Environmental Law v. Office of the United States
Trade Representative (CIEL 111), 845 F. Supp. 2d 252 (D.D.C. 2012); National Securiy Archive v.
Office of Independent Counsel, No. 89-2308, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13146 (D.D.C. Aug. 28,
1992); Prattv. Webster, 508 F. Supp. 751 (D.D.C. 1981); andJaffe v. CIA, 573 F. Supp. 377
(D.D.C. 1983). "Win" means that the final document or documents still contested after
negotiations concluded and all motions had been heard were ordered to be disclosed by the
trial court.
216. Marc Galanter, "ty the 'Haves" Come out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal
Change, 9 LAW & Soc'Y. REV. 95, 98 101(1974) (showing that repeat players have structural
advantages in the legal system).
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that is another government agency.
Our third model includes, in addition to the other variables discussed so
far, a dummy variable indicating whether or not the trial judge was
appointed by a Democrat. A large volume of literature in political science
and law demonstrates that ideology typically as measured by the party of
the appointing president has significant explanatory power as a
determinant of judicial behavior.2 11 We thus investigate the effect of the
appointing party.
217. JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 233 34 (1993). But see LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE
BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RATIONAL
CHOICE 27 28 (2013) (providing a more nuanced analysis showing that party influence is not
consistent across types of cases and level of court).
2014]
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Table 2: Logit Regression Models Predicting Disclosure
Order by District Court
(1) (2) (3)
Independent Variables Case Case + Party Case, Party and
characteristics characteristics Judge
characteristics
Foreign Affairs Prong -.01* .19 0.31
(.69) (0.73) (0.73)
Other exemption -1.63 -. 20 -0.13
claimed
(0.94) (0.88) (0.89)
In Camera Review 0.63 0.63 0.65
(0.87) (0.59) (0.59)
Vaughn Index 0.55 0.54 0.56
(0.92) (0.63) (0.64)
Sufficiency of Affidavit 0.59 0.13 0.20
Discussed
(0.63) (0.70) (0.71)
NGO Plaintiff 0.22 0.28
(0.65) (0.64)
Repeat Plaintiff 0.74 -0.74
(0.67) (0.66)





Constant -2.73*** -3.85*** -4.43***
(0.94) (1.26) (1.47)
Observations 159 158 158
Pseudo R-squared .07 .08 .09
Standard errors in parentheses
*** P<.01, ** p<O.05, * p<O. 1
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The results indicate that most of the cases do not produce significant
results. The most consistent predictor of whether or not the court will
order disclosure is the identity of the defendant. When the defendant is an
agency other than the most common targets, disclosure is more likely.
Political party affiliation of the judge does not make a difference.
C. Appellate Results
We continue the analysis by running the same model described above on
the appellate cases for all circuits. We include all variables described above
as well as additional variables to capture whether the panel has a majority
of judges appointed by Democratic presidents (DEMAPP) and a dummy
variable for cases in the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals. Our findings are
somewhat similar to the district court results, in that plaintiff characteristics
are strong predictors of success. We observe that repeat plaintiffs have an
advantage, and "other" defendants (who can be presumed to have less
experience) have a disadvantage at the appellate level. In addition, cases
involving in camera review are associated with higher levels of disclosure.
Interestingly, the foreign affairs prong of Exemption One is associated with
more disclosure in one model, though the result is not consistent.
20141
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Table 3: Logit Regression Models Predicting Disclosure
Order by Appellate Court
(1) (2) (3)
Independent Variables
Foreign Affairs Prong 0.96 1.757** -13.65
(0.63) (0.80) (1,322)
Other Exemption Claimed -0.10 -0.32 -0.53
(0.66) (0.740) (0.79)
In Camera Review 0.48 1.21* 1.17*
(0.52) (0.62) (0.67)
Vaughn Index 0.60 0.69 1.04*
(0.51) (0.56) (0.62)
Sufficiency of Affidavit 0.18 -0.19 -0.15
Discussed
(0.56) (0.620) (0.669)
NGO Plaintiff -0.75 -0.95
(0.84) (0.99)
Repeat Plaintiff 1.94** 2.54***
(0.78) (0.96)
Defendant = Other 1.24** 1.13*
(0.55) (0.59)






Constant -2.459*** -4.22*** 11.26
(0.79) (1.09) (1,322)
Observations 105 105 105
Pseudo R-squared .06 .16 .22
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While the pooled results for all circuits show no special propensity for the
D.C. Circuit to support the government, our data presents some intriguing
findings when we examine party differences. Perhaps the most interesting
outcome is associated with panel composition, presented in the two panels
of Table 3. As noted, we distinguish between panels in which all judges are
appointed by Democrats, Republicans, or if the panel is mixed. Party
composition has played an important role in recent understandings of
judicial behavior, and our evidence is partly consistent with this
literature. 218 Of the four cases in which the D.C. Circuit granted
disclosure, three were decided by panels that included two Democratic
appointees, and three Democratic appointees decided one of the cases. 219
In other words, panels of the D.C. Circuit composed of a majority of Republican
appointees have never granted disclosure when Exemption One is invoked. 220 While this
is perhaps not surprising, it is an interesting and important result, and
contrasts with the results reported above for district cases in which party
affiliation made no difference.
At the same time, the broader sample of appellate cases does not exhibit
the same pattern. Looking at Table 3b, we see that the D.C. Circuit
pattern is not replicated in the other circuits. Indeed, in other circuits, all-
Republican panels appear to be more likely to side with the plaintiff. And in
general, the D.C. Circuit appears particularly deferential toward
218. See generally Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of Arbitrariness
Review, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 761 (2008) (looking at panel composition in administrative law).
See Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Judicial Ideology and the Tranformation of Voting Rights
Jurudence, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1493, 1493 94 (2008) (discussing effects of panel
composition in Voting Rights Act cases); StephenJ. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Trading Votesfor
Reasoning: Covering in Judicial Opinions, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 735, 739 (2008) (reviewing research
on judicial voting in panels); FRANK B. CROSS, DECISION MAKING IN THE US COURTS OF
APPEALS 176 77 (2007) (analyzing influence of appointing president on circuit court
decisions); Jonathan P. Kastellec, Panel Composition and Judicial Compliance on the US. Courts of
Appeals, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 421, 422 & n.2 (2007) (integrating studies on judicial
compliance, panel decisionmaking, and case selection).
219. McGehee v. CIA, 697 F.2d 1095, 1101 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (two Democrat panel
finding that agencies bear the burden of proof, under reasonableness standards); Schaffer v.
Kissinger, 505 F.2d 389, 391 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (two Democrat panel giving burden of proof
to government agency, as well as giving plaintiff the right to limied discovery); Allen v. CIA,
636 F.2d 1287, 1298 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (three Democrat panel allowing for partial disclosure
and prohibiting conclusory affidavits as sufficient proof of meeting a FOIA exemption);
Founding Church of Scientology of Washington, D.C., Inc. v. Bell, 603 F.2d 945, 949 50
(D.C. Cir. 1979) (two Democrat panel defining a more limited understanding of the FOIA
exemptions by analyzing legislative intent and requiring more than substantial compliance
on the government's behalf.
220. A t-test for difference in means indicates the difference (t=-1.53) is just shy of
significant at the 10% confidence level (Pr(T < t) = 0.06).
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government. To be sure, the multivariate results suggest that this is largely
explained by case characteristics and party type. Still, the suggestion that
party status may matter in one court is consistent with recent scholarship
that finds that the influence of ideology increases at higher levels of the
federal bench."' 1 We have also identified an important difference among
appellate circuits, in which the D.C. Circuit behaves differently from
others. This finding is consistent with notions of specialization, but also
may reflect excessive deference by a court that plays a central role in the
modem administrative state.
Table 3a: Panel Composition Summary: D.C. Circuit Only
Appointing # Cases (%) # P wins* (%)
President
All Republican 5 (.14) 0 (.00)
2 Republican
1 Democratic 10 (.28) 0 (.00)
2 Democratic
1 Republican 15 (.39) 3 (.20)
All Democratic 7 (.19) 1 (.14)
TOTAL 37 4
Table 3b: Panel Composition Summary: All Circuits Besides
D.C.
222
Appointing # Cases (%) # P wins*(%)
President
All Republican 10 (.14) 4 (.40)
2 Republican
1 Democratic 23 (.33) 7 (.30)
2 Democratic
1 Republican 24 (.34) 4 (.17)
All Democratic 13 (.19) 5 (.38)
TOTAL 70 20
221. See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 217, at 27.
222. These case were distributed as follows: First Circuit six cases; Second Circuit
fourteen cases; Third Circuit seven cases; Fourth Circuit three cases; Fifth Circuit five
cases; Sixth Circuit two cases; Seventh Circuit four cases; Eighth Circuitwo cases;
Ninth Circuit twenty cases; Tenth Circuit one case; Eleventh Circuit five cases;
Federal Circuit one case.
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D. Summary and Discussion
To summarize our findings, full or partial disclosure in FOIA cases in
which the government invokes Exemption One is relatively rare, and it
occurs in only around a small percentage of cases that go to trial. Case
characteristics and trial judge characteristics are not important
determinants of outcomes at the trial level, but the former do seem to
matter somewhat at the appellate level, where experience seems to predict
success. In addition, we have suggested that while politics does not seem to
make a difference at the appellate level, the D.C. Circuit may be an
exception in this regard, in that Democratic-dominated panels are more
likely to order or affirm disclosure than are those with a majority of
Republican-appointees. This is generally consistent with the observation
that panel effects are strong at the appellate courts.
22 3
Our single most consistent finding is that repeat players seem to have an
advantage in FOIA litigation. This is consistent with a long line of
literature that emphasizes the informational advantage of repeat players in
various litigation contexts.2 2 4 Repeat players can choose which cases to
bring, and can also exploit their superior knowledge to select cases to
settle.22 1 Presumably, in the context of FOIA Exemption One, experienced
defendants know what arguments are likely to convince judges that genuine
national security interests are at stake, know how to construct a Vaughn
Index, and know how to manage the disclosure process. Experienced
plaintiffs, on the other hand, know what cases to push and what to settle,
and so may be able to prevail on disclosure claims that go all the way to
trial.
V. THE CONFLUENCE OF Two NARRATIVES
The growth of the national security state from the post-World War II era
to the post-9/11 era has been well-documented.2 2 ' The very concept of a
war on terror means that the United States can continually exist in what
Georgio Agamben calls the "state of exception," where legitimate
223. See EPSTEIN, ETAL., supra note 217, at 1535 4.
224. Galanter, supra note 216, at 97 114 (identifying advantages repeat players in
litigation).
225. George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection o DisputesforLitation, 13J. LEGAL
STUD. 1, 4 (1984) (proposing a settlement model); Leandra Lederman, Which Cases Go to
Trial.: An Empirical Study of Predictors of Failure to Settle, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 315, 337
n. 105 (1999) (describing repeat players in tax litigation).
226. See, e.g., David Jablonsky, The State of the National Security State, PARAMETERS Winter
2002 2003, at 4, 11, available at http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters
/articles/02winter/ablonsk.pdf (last visited Nov. 1, 2014).
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governments expand their powers and suspend the rule of law in response
to emergencies. 2 Those powers are meant to end when the emergency is
over, or the appropriate government actors have ratified steps taken to
respond to an emergency.228 Agamben identified the actions taken by
President Bush after September 11 th what we have come to call the "War
on Terror" as an example of a continuing state of exception.229 When
attack is imminent, as it must be in a "war," cognitive psychology tells us
that humans favor overestimation of risks, further tilting decisionmaking
towards national security secrecy and against civil liberties and access. 230
A balancing act between secrecy and disclosure has been a hallmark of
American history, but it has not always been tilted so strongly toward
secrecy. The trend has been long and gradual. The Constitutional
Convention was held in secret, but even in the first days of the new
republic, the populace relied on patriots and the press for disclosure.
231
One measure of the trend comes from the Department of State's
publication Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), which has published
diplomatic dispatches since 1861.232 The first volumes actually contained
contemporaneous dispatches; until the end of the century, FRUS published
dispatches that were only a few months old.233 Originally, the State
Department did not really keep secrets, but as the national security state
has expanded, so has the amount of time that dispatches remained secret. 234
227. STATE OF EXCEPTION, supra note 104, at 2 6.
228. See, e.g., id. at 12 16, 20 21 (providing an example of a state of exception in the
United States that lasted for ten weeks, during which President Lincoln functioned as an
"absolute dictator" by decreeing that an army should be raised and convening a special
session of Congressacts which were later ratified by Congress).
229. Id. at 3 4 (illustrating the state of exception by the military order President Bush
issued on November 13, 2001, authorizing the indefinite detntion of noncitizens suspected
of involvement in terrorist activities, without providing those detainees the status of persons
charged with a crime under U.S. law, or the status of prisoners of war as defined by the
Geneva Convention).
230. GROSS, supra now 16, at 47.
231. ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 332 34 (1973)
(discussing the popular sentiment against government secrecy during the early years of U.S.
independence, as well as the relatively unchecked power of the press to disclose government
secrets at that time).
232. See generaly About the Foreign Relations of the United States Series, U.S. DEP'T OF
STATE, OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/about-
frus (last visited Nov. 2, 2014) (describing the Forein Relations of the United States (FRUS) series
as the official documentary historical record of major U.S. foreign policy decisions that have
been declassified and edited for publication, beginning with the Lincoln Administration).
233. SCHLESINGER,supra note 231, at 336.
234. Id. ("[Tihe State Department before the First World War had no secrets whatever,
except for personnel reports." (quoting John Bassett Moore, former Assistant Secretary of
State)).
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In 2013, the first volume of dispatches from the Carter Administration
(1977 1981) was published, over thirty years after Carter left office. 
2 35
The nature of classification orders has changed over the decades. There
was not a formal executive policy on classification until an order
establishing a military classification system was signed by Franklin D.
Roosevelt in 1940.23' Then, in 1950, President Truman issued a new
executive order for military secrets2 3 7 and another in 1951 that, for the first
time, allowed any department or agency to classify information when it
seemed "necessary in the interest of national security." 238 In 1955,
President Eisenhower replaced it with Executive Order 10,501.23' This
changed the classification standard from "national security" to "national
defense" and cut back on the number of agencies that could be classified.4 0
These executive orders created entrenched security bureaucracies, and the
Executive Branch has never looked back. 41 Congress started studying
overclassification,2 42 but has not been able to eliminate or even reduce the
problem, which is deeply rooted in the culture and incentive structure of
the bureaucracy.
There have been arguments made whenever there is a national
emergency of some kind whether we are fighting communism or fascism
or waging war on terrorism that the nature of the risks involved requires
235. There is a new history of the FRUS by the Department of State, documenting the
clash between secrecy and disclosure; the conclusion the Department of State comes to is
that secrecy is more of a problem than disclosure. See William B. McAllister &Joshua Botts,
Conclusion to WILLIAM B. McALLISTER, ET AL., TOWARD "THOROUGH, ACCURATE, AND
RELIABLE": A HISTORY OF THE FOREIGNRELAIONS OF THE UNITED S ATES SERIES, 316, 318
(preview ed. 2013), available at http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus-history.pdf
("The historical evidence this book presents indicates that the most significant negative
repercussions attributable to the FRUS series have not involved damaging releases of
potentially-sensitive national security or intelligence information. Rather, the reputation of
the U.S. Government has suffered primarily from failures of the series to document
significant historical events or acknowledge past actions. FRUS realizes its promise when it
fulfills global expectations for openness that promote democracy and encourage [human]
freedom.").
236. Exec. Order No. 8381, 3 C.F.R. 634, 634-35 (1938 1943).
237. Exec. Order No. 10,104, 3 C.F.R. 298, 298 99 (1949 1953).
238. Exec. Order No. 10, 290, 3 C.F.R. 789, 790 91 (1949 1953).
239. Exec. Order No. 10,501, 3 C.F.R. 979, 981, 984 (1949 1953).
240. Id.
241. SCHLESINGER, supra note 231, at 340.
242. William G. Phillips, The Government's Classification System, in NONE OF YOUR
BUSINESS: GOVERNMENT SECRECY IN AMERICA 61, 66 (Norman Dorsen & Stephen Gillers
eds., 1974) (noting that the Defense Department's Coolidge Committee and the Commission




the country to set aside the checks and balances of the Constitution.2 43 The
argument is that whatever is happening now is so extraordinary that the
Founders could not possibly have imagined emergencies of such
magnitude.2 44 But this argument "over-looks the profound historical fact
that the Founders fashioned the Constitution with its unique checks and
balances at a time when the incipient American republic was in the greatest
danger of any in its long future existence." 245
The exigency argument has been made successfully and courts have
approved violations of civil liberty that, in hindsight, were clearly
unnecessary; those decisions are a blot on American history.2 46  Cases
brought under the Espionage Act of 1917 24' and the Sedition Act of 1918 248
were upheld, but after the war, every convicted person received amnesty.
2 49
Korematsu v. United States250 is the paradigmatic example of a bad law upheld
for the wrong reasons.2 51 Since the Vietnam era, the Supreme Court has
been more willing to challenge executive claims; the courts have replaced
"the 'logical' presumption" of deference "with the 'pragmatic' presumption




The increased Supreme Court scrutiny started in the 1970s with the
Pentagon Papers, 53 but has not trickled down to the lower courts, the
243. Geoffrey R. Stone, National Secuity v. Civil Liberties, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 2203, 2203 08
(2007) (discussing judicial decisions limiting civil liberties that were later acknowledged to
have been unjustly decided in the interest of national security).
244. HART, supra note 78, at 13.
245. Id.
246. Stone, supra note 243.
247. Espionage Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 65-24, 40 Stat. 217 (prohibiting interference
with military recruitment, support of national enemies during wartime, or insubordination
in the military).
248. Sedition Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-150, 40 Stat. 553 (exwnding the Espionage
Act to limit certain civil liberties- specially speech).
249. Stone, supra note 243, at 2205; see also GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FRE
SPEECH IN WARTIME FROM THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM 230
32 (2004) (detailing the efforts made over many years to secure the release of those convicted
under the Espionage and Sedition Acts).
250. 323 U.S. 214, 215 16, 223 24 (1944) justifying violation of civil liberties in the
context ofJapanese internment camps).
25 1. Stone, supra note 243, at 2208 (explaining that while a presumption of deference to
executive and military officials during wartime may be logical in theory because judges have
little national security experience, this deference will fail in practice because it precludes
those making judgments from properly taking the relevant factors into account in a fair and
reasonable way).
252. Jd. at 2212.
253. Id. at 2210 11; see also Adrian Vermeule, The Judiciag is a Th9 , Not An It: Interpretive
Theory and the Falla of Division, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 549, 562 (2005) (stating that
lower courts can choose to defy the Supreme Court's instructions and that there is no real
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gatekeepers for FOIA requests. 254 The range of matters covered by
"national security" keeps expanding. In the four epochs of national security
that Laura Donohue has identified, 55 our era is characterized by a move
toward using national security claims to balance competing risks.2 56 As a
result, in the realm of FOIA requests, judicial compliance with the
congressionally mandated standard of review is even more important.
There are not many tools utilized by the courts deciding FOIA cases to
perform their functions of review referees, experts, and masters have not
been utilized and discovery is not normally available2 57  but the courts
deciding FOIA cases do have one tool they have crafted to help make
decisions: the Vaughn Index.2 58 Prior to the D.C. Circuit's decision in
Vaughn v. Rosen, the FOIA provided no mechanism for government agencies
to justify and substantiate their documentary withholdings. Thus, plaintiffs
penalty for lower courts' non-compliance).
254. Kwoka, supra note 14, at 221 ("Because bringing a FOIA case in federal court is the
primary legal tool to challenge the government's right to keep secret its operations, the
robustness of our democracy rests, at least in part, on the robustness of the FOIA litigation
process itself.").
255. See generalyl Donohue, supra note 104 (listing the four epochs as: (1) "Protecting the
union: 1776 1898"; (2) "Formative international engagement and domestic power: 1898
1930"; (3) "The ascendance of national security: 1930 1989"; and (4) "Balancing risk: 1989
2012").
256. Id. at 1589 (listing risks such as "climate change, pandemic disease, drugs, and
organized crime," and stating that "[n]ational security persists in its position of dominance,
constantly expanding to envelop other issues"). Part of the problem with the current
security state is the sheer size of the security bureaucracy. See Bridget Rose Nolan,
Information Sharing and Collaboration in the United States Intelligence Community: An
Ethnographic Study of the National Counterterrorism Center 158 (2013) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania), http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nolan-
nctc.pdf ("Perhaps the most drastic recommendation I heard was that in some ways it would
make sense to reduce the size of [the National Counterterrorism Center] or even of the
entire [Intelligence Community]. For the analysts, this would address the hindrances that
come along with a bloated bureaucracy; it would also help with what they perceived to be
excessive redundancy (as opposed to a lower level of redundancy which was deemed
necessary for safety and accuracy reasons)."); see also Steve Aftergood: To Fix US Intelligence, Shrink
It, PUB. INTELLIGENCE BLOG (Sept. 30, 2013), http://www.phibetaiota.net/2013/09/steve-
aftergood-to-fix-us-intelligence-shrink-it/ (stating that Nolan's dissertation "gives voice to
intelligence analysts who are overwhelmed by information, flustered by competitive
pressures from their home agencies, and weighed down by dubious security policies"). But
see CHARLES NEMFAKOS ELT AL., WORKFORCE PLANNING IN THE INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY: A RETROSPECTIVE ch. 2 (2013), available at http://www.rand.org/content/
dam/rand/pubs/research-reports/RR100/RR 14/RANDRRl 14.pdf (discussing a
contrary view).
257. Kwoka, supra note 14, at 235 (noting that discovery is very rare in FOIA litigation);
see also Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 828 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
258. See supra note 22.
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seeking disclosure of government documents often received little to no
information regarding the reason why documents were not released.
Moreover, courts were hindered in their ability to assess the merits of FOIA
withholdings. In Vaughn, the court declined to accept the United States
Civil Service Commission's affidavit affirming that certain documents
requested by the plaintiff were subject to exemption because it found that
the agency's assertions were conclusory and generalized. Instead, the court
required the agency to provide an itemized list of withheld documents,
complete with cross-referenced explanations of statutory exemptions for
each withholding. This item is known as a "Vaughn Index." As the Vaughn
court explained, the requirements set forth by the court serve two main
purposes: (1) to ensure "part[ies'] right to information" and (2) to allow "the
court system effectively and efficiently to evaluate the factual nature of
disputed information." 259
There are many justifications for openness and transparency in
government. The justifications emphasize the role of openness in curbing
fraud, corruption, and despotism,26 0 the role of openness in curing social
and industrial diseases,26 1 and the role of openness in informed and
enlightened government decisionmaking 2 6 2 Another benefit of openness is
preventing new attacks. As the 9/11 Commission found, more publicity
could have prevented 9/11.263 There is the more modem justification that
259. Vaughn, 484 F.2d at 826.
260. WORLD BANK, THE ROLE OF PARLIAMENT IN CURBING CORRUPTION 252 54
(Rick Stapenhurst et al. eds., 2006) [hereinafter CURBING CORRUPTION] (examining the role
of parliament's "culture of compliance, openness, and accountability" in preventing
government abuses of power).
261. LouIs D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY, AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92
(1914) ("Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial diseases.
Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants .... ").
262. See e.g., Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Secrey: How America Blew It, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 10,
1990, at 14 (discussing the long-kept secret of the Cold War that American analysts
consistently inflated the Soviet economy's ability and rate of growth, leading to decades of
American over spending in an effort to catch up to this imaginary Soviet economy). All of
these miscalculations were secret and were based on secret evidence. Id. Moynihan himself
had, in the 1970s, pointed out the visible flaws in the American analysis of the Soviet
economy. Id.
263. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 46, at 46, 115 (2004). The only instance
cited by the 9/11 Commission that might have prevented the attacks was a statement by the
terrorists' paymaster that had they known that Zacarias Moussaoui had been arrested at a
flight school in Minnesota, bin Laden would have called off the attacks. Id.at 247. The
9/11 Commission concluded that only "publicity" could have "derailed the plot." Id. at
276. Other beneficial examples of open access include the capture of the Unabomber only
after the New York Times reluctantly agreed to publish the Manifesto. JENNIFER DARYL
SLACK &JOHN MACGREGOR WISE, CULTURE & TECHNOLOGY: A PRIMER 83 (2005); This
Day in History: Sep. 19, 1995: Unabomber Manifesto Published, http://www.history.com/this-day-
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citizens are entitled to timely and useful information from their government
to enable citizen decisionmaking in our complex, modern world.6 4 But
there is a surprising benefit of allowing only proper and limited
classification of national security information: trust in the government. In
the now classic book Secrecy, Daniel Moynihan compellingly argues that the
climate of secrecy engendered by Cold War politics created such an
atmosphere of political distrust that people did not believe the government
even when the government was telling the truth.6s
Proponents of transparency emphasize the role of openness in curbing
fraud, corruption, and despotism,2 6 6 the role of openness as the cure for
social and industrial diseases,2 6 7 and the role of openness in informed and
enlightened government decisionmaking. 268 There are, of course,
arguments against openness. The belief that transparency is a complete
good, or that it always leads to the best decisionmaking, has its critics.
26 9
And there is the undeniable fact that some modicum of information must
be kept secret. But in the context of a FOIA request, the benefits of
transparency are meant to be weighed against the costs of publicity. Courts
have been assigned this task of balancing secrecy and national security, but
they have generally declined to perform it.
in-history/unabomber-manifesto-published (last visited Nov. 2, 2014). The Washington
sniper was apprehended only after a license plate number, kept secret by law enforcement,
was leaked to the press. Emerging 7hreats: Overclassication and Pseudo Class[fication: Hearing before
the Subcomm. on Nat'l Security, Emerging Threats, & Int'l Relations of H.R. Comm. on Govt Reform,
109th Cong. at 124-25 (2005) (statement of Thomas S. Blanton, National Security Archive).
264. ARCHON FUNG ET AL., FULL DISCLOSURE: THE POLITICS, PERILS AND PROMISE OF
TARGETED TRANSPARENCY 5 7 (2007) (examining incomplete disclosure that is irrelevant to
consumers).
265. DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, SECRECY 52 5 (1998) (recounting history of secrecy
as a tool for the American government). There are, of course, arguments against
transparency in high-level government decisionmaking.
266. CURBING CORRUPTION, supra note 260, at 252 53.
267. See BRANDEIS, supra note 261, at 92.
268. Moynihan, supra note 262.
269. See, e.g.,Justin Fox & Richard Van Weelden, Costly Transparen9, 96J. PUB. ECON.
142, 142 (2012) (arguing that when individuals delegate authority to experts, transparency
does not always improve the expert's actions; "observing the consequences of the expert's
actions can be socially harmful in many economically relevant environments"). Fox and
Van Weelden's article describes the situation a legislator faces who must choose whether or
not to approve an executive's proposal, for example, to authorize the Bush Administration
to go to war against Iraq; if a Senator had weak information that there were no weapons of
mass destruction, she would be more likely to oppose the war if there was no chance of
finding out if in fact there were any weapons of mass destruction. Id. at 143. If the cost of
an unjustified war was really high, voting against the war would have been in a voter's




There are two powerful narratives at play in the context of the national
security exemption to the FOIA. On the one hand, there is the rise of the
national security state from the end of World War II to the present. The
theme underlying this state has always been: there are enemies we must
combat, and we need the tools to do so. "0 And it is in fact true that there
are enemies of the United States. But as the enemies have become more
diffuse, the tools the government uses have become both more sophisticated
and more invasive. The level of spying on American citizens that has been
uncovered by the Snowden releases of classified information has caused a
lot of controversy and generated a heated discussion about the balance of
power between citizens and the government.2"1 On the other hand, there is
seemingly unanimous agreement that too much information is classified;
the differences in opinion are about the percentage of documents that are
overclassified, not the fact of overclassification.
The courts should act as a corrective. The courts should follow the
directives they were given in the revisions to the FOIA in 1974 often
enough that those who routinely classify documents that could in fact be
part of the public conversation think before they classify: is this going to
pass muster? Since there are so few courts that challenge the government's
assertions that releasing a particular document will damage national
security, there is no reason to withhold the classification stamp. In the
wake of the Wikileaks and Snowden leaks, we have James Clapper telling us
that the leaks started an important public debate.2"2 His comment referred
specifically to the leak of a classified Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
(FISA) court order; that classification prevented a necessary public debate,
and the order should not have been classified. In fact, the Court recently
270. A recent study suggests that, in the event of an actual attack, large or small, the
American people would be willing to lose constitutionally protected liberties and the national
security community would also support constitutional infringement without changing
existing laws, but that courts would "encourage new laws and acts." See Robin L. Schwartz,
Predicting the Loss of Constitutional Rights and Civil Liberties in the Name of National
Security 37 (Aug. 22, 2010) (unpublished Capstone Study, American Military University),
http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1677496. The report's ultimate conclusion is that laws eroding
currently constitutionally protcted rights would be approved by courts in the event of a
large-scale domestic attack. Id. at 3, 7.
271. The NSA Files, GUARDIAN, http://www.theguardian.com/world/the-nsa-files (last
accessed Nov. 3, 2014) (collecting all of the Guardians' stories on Snowden's leaks regarding
NSA surveillance).
272. Dilanian, supra note 3 ("I think it's clear that some of the conversations this has
generated, some of the debate, actually needed to happen. If there's a good side to this,
maybe that's it."). This is not to say that the Snowden leaks have not changed the landscape
for U.S. foreign relations or national security, and made many conversations with both allies
and enemies more difficult. This is not the same, however, as damage to the national
security. Id.
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issued an order stating that all FISA court orders would be reviewed and
released as appropriate. 2 " These acknowledgements and concessions are
not possible without concluding that the orders were originally
overclassified.2 74
When reviewing the denial of a FOIA request, all Article III judges are
competent to balance national security and the public interest; nothing in
such a review requires or is likely to lead to rubber-stamping the release of
documents. We started our analysis with a foreign affairs Exemption One
case where, at least so far, the document requested has been ordered
released, even though the district court never saw the document. There
was a Vaughn Index ordered in CIEL L
2
1
We end with another case that has generated lots of headlines,
International Counsel Bureau v. U.S. Department of Defense.2 6 In International
Counsel Bureau v. U.S. Department of Defense I, the district court held the
government's declarations to a standard of specificity and adequacy.
2 77
The plaintiffs sought records about four individuals detained at the
Guantanamo Bay Naval Air Base. The first FOIA request was for medical
records for two detainees; the second FOIA request sought video,
photographs, and other recorded documents about the four named
detainees. The DOJ submitted a Vaughn Index and two declarations, and
moved for summary judgment as to the adequacy of its search and its
inability to segregate non-exempt material from exempt material, as well as
the propriety of its four claimed exemptions, as to the fifty-nine
photographs, forty-five videos, and one audiotape it had identified.
Regarding the government's Vaughn Index, Judge John D. Bates said
"[tihis court cannot fairly assess the propriety of the exemption claims
because there is a dearth of 'reasonably specific detail' about how the
exemptions apply to the documents as a whole."2'  The Department of
Defense was ordered to "conduct a new search of the records of the
Defense Department and its components for documents responsive to
plaintiffs' FOIA request." 2'  After the Department's response, the parties
273. In re Orders of This Court Interpreting Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act, No.
Misc. 13-02, 2013 WL 5460064 (FISA Ct. Sep. 13, 2013).
274. Not "improperly" classified, but classified when not classifying the information
would not have harmed national security. See comments on Dubin v. United States, 363 F.2d
938 (Ct. Cl. 1966), supra note 11.
275. Ctr. For Int'l Envd. Law v. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (CIEL 1), 505
F. Supp. 2d 150, 154 (D.D.C. 2007).
276. Int'l Counsel Bureau v. U.S. Dep't of Def. (ICB v. DOD 1), 657 F. Supp. 2d 33
(D.D.C. 2009).
277. Id.at38 41.
278. Jd. at 42.
279. -d. at 43.
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again cross-filed for summary judgment. 280
This time around, the government's search was found adequate, but all
of the claims of exemption were not. 81 Although the government's
declarations established that at least some portions of the video recordings
were properly withheld under Exemption One, the same was not true for
the remaining audio recording. To justify withholding this recording, the
government offers only the conclusory statements that "releasing it would
risk disclosing intelligence sources and methods, causing harm to national
security" and that "it contains information concerning that [sic] might
identify intelligence sources and methods, and information that, if released,
can cause damage to national security." 8 2 The court found this insufficient
and sent the government back to try one last time.
Back for the third time, the government tried again. 83 The court found
the government's attempts to subdivide the recordings into severable parts
"'cross-referenced to the relevant portion of the claimed
exemption' false, inconsistent, and confusing." 284 The government's
"Vaughn indices and declarations also provide no illumination as to the
actual lengths of the video, when certain segments begin and end, or how
long such subdivided segments run."2 8' The court ordered the government
to produce three representative videotapes for the court's in camera
review. 286 The government complied, and, despite the court's previous
statement that it would not give the government another chance,2 87 the
court accepted new declarations,2 88 finding them plausible: "In any event,
these additional declarations, providing plausible explanations of the harm
to national security from the release of even solo images of a detainee, and
explanations for why the videos were appropriately classified in their
280. Int'l Counsel Bureau v. U.S. Dep't of Def. (ICB v. DOD I1), 723 F. Supp. 2d 54, 55
56 (D.D.C. 2010).
281. Id.at60 64.
282. Id. at 64.
283. Int'l Counsel Bureau v. U.S. Dep't of Def. (ICB v. DOD 1I1), 864 F. Supp. 2d 101
(D.D.C. 2012).
284. Id. at 105.
285. Id. at 106.
286. Id. at 110. Compare this to the one case where the court appointed a referee, in a
FOIA lawsuit, In re United States Department ofDefense, 848 F.2d 232, 242 (D.C. Cir. 1988), in
which the district court did not trust the government to be impartial in its choices. See Wald,
supra note 98, at 408.
287. ICBv. DOD II, 723 F. Supp. at 54, 65 (D.D.C. 2010) ("The Court repeats that the
Department is now being given a third opportunity to justify withholding these recordings;
the Court will not offer it a fourth.").
288. ICBv.DODIV, 906 F.Supp. 2d 1,9 (D.D.C. 2012).
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entirety, 'merit substantial weight."'2 89
The plaintiffs did not get the documents they requested. It is open to
debate whether the government should get so many attempts to justify
withholding documents before they hit on one that resonates,2 9 0 but Judge
Bates did make the government do what it is supposed to do: link specific
harm to a specific disclosure, and that is a good sign. However painful the
process, the government needed to justify its rationale for withholding the
requested documents in a meaningful way, and holding the government to
that standard is what the FOIA was intended to require.
CONCLUSION
In light of the overwhelming evidence that agencies routinely overclassify
documents, courts can play an important role in breaking into that routine.
They can do so by taking seriously their obligation to perform de novo and
in camera review of documents when agencies invoke the first exemption to
the FOIA, and by asking for the assistance of experts in analyzing these
claims. As the ICB v. DOD cases demonstrate, holding the government to
the standards required by the FOIA does not result in rubber-stamping the
production of documents. Some method of streamlining the review process
would certainly reduce the costs of getting information to the public, both
for the government and for the currently very limited class of plaintiffs who
can afford to take contested requests through the existing process. The
result would be a better balance between transparency and national
security than currently exists. Since overclassification is in its own way an
effort to "curb open public discussion of vital public issues,"2 9 1 courts that
hold the government to the exacting standard required by the FOIA are
protecting that open debate. This is not a role the courts should knowingly
shirk.
289. Id. at 6.
290. This was also a problem in the CIEL case. See supra now 5 7 and accompanying
text. It is particularly troubling when the government does not raise the national security
exemption until all other efforts have failed.
291. See, e.g., David C. Vladeck, Litigating National Secufity Cases in the Aftermath of 911, 2 J.
NAT'L SEC. L. & POL'Y 165, 193 (2006); see also Dilanian, supra note 3 (discussing Clapper's
view of classification).
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